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I. INTRODUCTION
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity for an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.'
This country's public education system has a long and tragic history of
discrimination against handicapped children. 2 State educational authorities have
excluded many handicapped children from schools on the grounds that they were
uneducable or detrimental to the general welfare and progress of other students.
Those who were admitted into the system were generally relegated to inferior
facilities and ineffective programming. 3 Congress attempted to remedy this situation
by enacting the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA or the
Act).4 The EAHCA provides financial assistance to state and local school authorities
to assist in the provision of special educational services to handicapped children. 5
The Act's primary goal is to assure that every handicapped child receives a free
appropriate public education. 6
Each handicapped child, depending upon his particular impairment(s), presents
a unique collection of varied needs. Unfortunately, Congress was rather cryptic in
specifying which needs must be addressed as "educational" needs under the Act. As
a result, disputes frequently arise between advocates for the child and school districts
over the types of services which must be provided as part of a free appropriate public
education. School officials often take a narrow view of the concept of education and
argue that educational needs are very limited in scope. They feel that educational
needs must be distinguished from any needs which arise as a result of problems in the
social, emotional, behavioral, and custodial areas, asserting that the latter are clearly
noneducational in nature. Under this restricted view, educational services may not
even be appropriate for some seriously handicapped children whose noneducational
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1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See generally THE LEGAL Riirs or HANDIlcAP' PuSsoxs 53-194 (R. Burgdorf, Jr. ed. 1980); Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLtm L. Rv. 855 (1975).
3. See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
4. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1400-1401, 1405-1406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985)).
5. The Act contains a formula for determining the maximum allocation each state is entitled to during any fiscal
year. 20 U.S.C.A. § 141 l(a) (-%Vest 1978 and Supp. 1987). These funds are not intended to meet the full cost of educating
handicapped children but to assist states in their efforts. S. RP. No. 168, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE Coxo. & ADmiN. NEws 1425, 1431, 1446 [hereinafter SENATE REPOR].
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982).
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needs are primary. The child's advocates espouse a much broader concept of
education. They assert that educational needs of a handicapped child transcend the
distinctions made by school officials and require a wide array of services not
traditionally associated with the education of nonhandicapped children.
These educational versus noneducational disputes most often arise when the
services at issue are expensive. The service which provokes the most debate is the
residential placement. 7 School districts often maintain that if such a placement is
required, it is necessitated primarily by noneducational needs. This, they argue, shifts
the financial responsibility to the parents or, if the parents cannot afford the
placement, to the appropriate public service agency. The parents and the potentially
responsible agencies will, in turn, assert that the needs to be addressed are
educational and thus the placement is the responsibility of the school district. These
conflicts over the proper characterization of "educational needs," may result in a
long delay or the complete denial of appropriate services to the child. Often an
administrative or judicial decisionmaker is called upon to make the complex
determination of whether a required placement is for educational or noneducational
purposes.
This Article examines the educational-noneducational controversy focusing on
residential placement disputes as a prototype. 8 The thesis of this Article is that
Congress never intended for service provision responsibility under the Act to be based
upon complex distinctions between a child's educational and noneducational needs.
It will argue that such determinations cannot, in reality, be accurately made. Any
such distinction is illusory and serves, in itself, to foster, instead of resolve,
interagency disputes regarding service provision responsibility.
This Article will demonstrate that the Act was specifically designed to eliminate
educational-noneducational disputes and the interagency buck-passing which accom-
panies them. It will present evidence that Congress adopted a broad view of
educational needs and responsibilities; a view which was intended to collapse the
traditional dichotomy between educational and noneducational needs. The Article
maintains that Congress intended that even the most severely handicapped children-
those historically viewed as being uneducable-be provided services under the Act to
assist them in developing as total human beings, living as effectively as possible,
whatever their environment. This Article will show that to achieve these objectives,
Congress planned for educational services that extended well beyond those services
traditionally associated with the education of nonhandicapped children. Conse-
quently, to base educational service responsibility on the traditional distinction
between educational and noneducational needs effectively defeats congressional
intent. Instead, educational responsibility should be liberally construed to meet the
developmental needs of even the most severely handicapped.
7. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
8. The educational-noneducational controversy arises over requests for various nontraditional expensive services.
This Article focuses on the residential placement as it often contains many of these disputed services within its
programmatic package.
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This Article will begin by examining the issue of whether all handicapped
children, regardless of the severity of their impairments, are educable. It will show
that Congress adopted the zero reject model of special education which considers all
handicapped children capable of developing through appropriate services. With the
zero reject model in mind, this Article will next consider what needs and correspond-
ing services Congress considered educational in nature when enacting the EAHCA.
This Article will approach this question by first demonstrating that the educational-
noneducational controversy arose from the ambiguous statutory definition of a free
appropriate public education. It will then explore the judicial and professional
development of the definition of special education and argue that Congress intended
the concept of special education to be construed broadly.
This Article will then examine the educational versus noneducational contro-
versy in the context of the Act's residential placement provision. It will review the
various approaches taken by administrative and judicial decisionmakers in determin-
ing residential placement responsibility under the Act. This Article will demonstrate
how each such approach is in conflict with the Act's language and congressional
intent, and ultimately serves to fuel further disputes. This Article will then propose
a different approach to determining residential placement and other service respon-
sibility that is consistent with both Congress' adoption of the zero reject model of
special education and its broad view of the concept of education. It will conclude by
suggesting an alternative method of developing and financing educational services
which is more in line with congressional expectation as evidenced by the Act's
legislative history.
II. THE EDUCABILITY OF ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
A. The Professional Development of the Zero Reject Model
Residential placements are appropriate only for those handicapped children who
require care and a highly structured environment on a twenty-four hour basis. These
children include some of the most severely handicapped. An issue still being debated
is whether all such children can reap any benefit from educational programming. 9 If
it is, in fact, true that some severely handicapped children are uneducable, it would
be an enormous waste of resources to require school districts to provide such services
as educational residential placements for them.
The educable-uneducable distinction has its roots in the early 1900s. This
notion was fostered by early American teachers when they realized that some
handicapped children were not progressing within the traditional academic curricu-
lum of "reading, writing, and arithmetic." Instead of expanding and revising the
curriculum to meet the needs of these children, school officials simply characterized
9. See generally Rothstein, Educational Rights of Severely and Profoundly Handicapped Children, 61 NeB. L.
REv. 586, 612 (1982) (suggesting standards for determining whether an individual is educable); I ANALYsis AND
Iw'Erm n N DEvmwroEnrA DZsARI.mEs (1981) (symposium containing articles on the educability issue).
1091
1092 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:1089
them as uneducable. 10 A few states introduced formal classes for the mentally
impaired but usually limited admission to high functioning retardates. Only those
who succeeded in these programs were deemed educable while all other mentally
handicapped children were labeled uneducable and excluded from public school
attendance. Many times, such distinctions were based solely upon I.Q. test scores."I
Eventually, as special education techniques developed, it was found that
children below the "educable" cut-off point could benefit from educational pro-
grams.1 2 However, instead of admitting that such children were educable, profes-
sionals developed the new category of "trainable" for,these children. 13 As a result,
a three category classification system for handicapped children developed: the
educable, the trainable, and the sub-trainable.14 These labels, although misleading,
provided a justification for depriving many handicapped children of an adequate
education. Many states built these classifications into their legislative schemes for
education thus statutorily mandating the exclusion of many handicapped children
from public educational programming. 15
However, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a revolution in the area of special
education. Due in large part to the organizing of parents of handicapped children and
the public awareness they generated, 16 increased attention and resources were
devoted to the educational needs of the handicapped child.17 This attention led to the
discovery of new and more effective teaching aids and techniques for the handi-
capped. 18 A major breakthrough was the rise and general acceptance of the
"developmental model" of mental handicapping conditions. This model views
mentally handicapped children as developing individuals with the capacity to grow
10. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 871. See also J. WAU.IN, EDuCATION FMENTALLY HADCAPPIED CLDEN
(1955).
11. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 873.
12. THE LEGAL RIGHTs Or HANDICAPPED PERSONS, supra note 2, at 56-57.
13. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 873, 874.
14. An I.Q. score of fifty was somewhat arbitrarily established as a line of demarcation. Those scoring above fifty
were deemed educable and suitable for public school programs. Those not attaining this score were labeled trainable or
sub-trainable and were excluded from public educational programs. J. WA.sn, supra note 10, at 65. Other labels, based
upon I.Q. test scores, were also used. E.g., Idiot: a score of less than thirty (now commonly referred to as profoundly
handicapped); Imbecile: a score between thirty and fifty (now referred to as severely handicapped); Moron: a score
between fifty and seventy (now labeled mildly handicapped); Intellectually Dull: a score between seventy and eighty-five;
Dull-Normal: a score between eighty-five and ninety. A. YATM, BEHAVIOR TnEAPY 327 (1970).
15. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 3321.05 (Anderson 1975) (repealed 1976); OR. R v. STAT. § 336.090 (1947)
(repealed 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Purdon 1962) (amended 1965). A survey of state statutes describing
classes of handicapped children excluded from public education, and other statutory limits on state mandates for the
education of handicapped children is contained in several places in the legislative history of the EAHCA. See, e.g., SENATE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 1444-45.
16. E.g., the National Association for Retarded Children was formed in September of 1950. See generally E.
LEvN & E. WExLER, PL 94-142, AN Act OF CONGRESS 14-16 (1981) (describing the rise of the advocacy movement for the
handicapped).
17. The number of school districts offering some special educational services increased from 1500 in 1948 to 5600
in 1963. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 874. However, there was still an alarming shortage of services. For
example, in 1962, 20,000 teachers were educating retarded children in special programs, but the need was for 75,000.
In 1969, the number of teachers had increased to 34,000, but the need was estimated at 93,000. Roos, Trends and Issues
in Special Education for the Mentally Retarded, 5 Enuc. & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETA DED, 51 (1970).
18. Such advances included the use of teacher aides to increase the effectiveness of educators; increased
involvement of parents in the educational program; application of the autotelic responsive environment in the classroom;
and technological advances leading to specialized equipment such as the "talking typewriter" and audiovisual aids. Roos,
supra note 17, at 52-54.
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and learn. Under this model, even the most severely handicapped are presumed to
have potential for development.' 9
The increased acceptance of the developmental model provided a basis for the
rapid growth of educational programs and services for the handicapped. Many new
teaching strategies were developed. One such strategy was the use of operant
conditioning procedures. The theory behind these procedures is that a mental deficit
can be identified and overcome by systematic techniques. 20 Operant procedures were
shown to be successful with even the most severely handicapped children. 2' The
developmental model, with its emerging reality that all handicapped children could
benefit from educational programming, was in direct contrast to the previously
prevailing attitude that many handicapped children were uneducable. In professional
circles, this attitude was based in large part on the misapplication of the "medical
model" of mental handicaps. 22 The "medical model" views handicapping conditions
as sickness or disease best subject to medical treatment in medical facilities rather
than as a deficit subject to educational efforts. 23 The medical model relieves the
school of any responsibility for a handicapped child as it encourages the child to
remain submissive and receive treatment as opposed to becoming active in an
educational program. This, in turn, promotes passivity and hopelessness in the
child. 24
Success with even the most severely handicapped fostered the belief that the
scope of special educational programs should be expanded to all levels of handicap-
ping conditions. It was promptly discovered that the evaluative techniques which
established educability cut-off marks were inaccurate. It was shown that traditional
intelligence testing, which used an I.Q. mark of fifty to separate those who were
educable from those categorized as trainable, was artificial and arbitrary. Some
children classified as trainable were shown to have greater potential than some
classified as educable. 25 As a result, new evaluative techniques were developed
which measured a child's potential on the basis of many other factors than
intelligence. In addition, these new techniques implemented a number of subscores
as opposed to relying merely on one I.Q. score.2 6 The evaluations were used less to
19. For an extensive discussion of the developmental model, see generally F. MMOLASCINO, OVERVIEW OF PROoR.SSIVE
IDEOLOGY5N MmrALRErARATiON (1976); P. Roos, G. PATrSON & B. McCANN, E.%XAn moT DEvpIoErEAL MoDEL (1970);
Switzky, Rotatori, Miller & Freagon, The Developmental Model and Its Implications for Assessment and Instruction for
the SeverelylProfoundly Handicapped, 17 METAL RErARDATION 167, 168 (1979).
20. A. YATES, supra note 14, at 324.
21. Id. at 332-34 (citing examples of the most profoundly handicapped children learning such skills as eating,
toileting, and self-care); Roos, supra note 17, at 56; see also Stainback & Stainback, A Review of Research on the
Educability of Profoundly Retarded Persons, 18 Eovc. & TRmmaNG or THE MENrmLy RErARDEr 90 (1983) (reviewing
research evidence indicating the educability of profoundly retarded individuals).
22. A. YAms, supra note 14, at 324.
23. Roos, supra note 17, at 52.
24. Id. (also citing other destructive models for the handicapped including the model of the retarded as a "menace"
to society. The "menace model" operates to foreclose the retarded from services and integration into the community.
Also mentioned is the "subhuman model" for the retarded which fosters the attitude that the retarded do not share the
same feelings and needs as the rest of society). See also Reger, The Medical Model in Special Education, 9 PSYCHOLOGY
IN THE ScaooLs 8 (1972) (explaining and criticizing the use of the medical model).
25. J. \VWAu, supra note 10, at 65.
26. New testing techniques included the Vineland Social Maturity Scale which measures the capacity to look after
one's self in basic social activities; the Illinois Test of Psycholinguistic Abilities; and the Adaptive Behavior Checklist.
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distinguish between those who could be educated and those who could not, and more
for determining the type of educational programming appropriate for each particular
child.27 The attitude became prevalent that if a handicapped child failed a particular
educational task, the failure was not indicative of the child's inability or lack of
potential; instead it was taken as an indication that the program was defective or the
teacher had failed. 28
In 1961, the Washington State Board of Education prophesied the direction of
special education philosophy by promulgating the following definition of educability:
"A child shall be deemed educable if he possesses the potential to respond to and
benefit from educational experiences in terms of such factors as social competence,
emotional stability, self-care, a degree of vocational competency or intellectual
growth."29 This broad definition was interpreted as including all children and was
one of the first official recognitions of the "zero reject" model of special education.30
This model recognizes that all handicapped children, regardless of the gravity of their
handicap, are educable. The responsibility for failure of a child to learn is placed on
the system or the teacher rather than the one taught. 3'
The zero reject model became the dominant theme in special education, not only
in this country but internationally. In 1968, the International League of Societies for
the Mentally Handicapped adopted the position that "[t]he mentally retarded person
has a right ... to such education, training, habilitation and guidance as will enable
him to develop his ability and potential to the fullest possible extent, no matter how
severe his degree of disability." 32 The United Nations, in 1971, adopted a Resolution
stating that a mentally retarded individual has the right to "such education, training,
rehabilitation and guidance as will enable him to develop his ability and maximum
potential. '33
Despite the growing recognition, both here and abroad, that all handicapped
children are educable, large numbers of such children remained excluded from public
27. Appropriate evaluative testing procedures were eventually judicially enforced. See, e.g., Diana v. State Bd. of
Educ., C-70 37 RFP (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1970), cited in Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 882 & n.169.
28. See Lilly, A Training Based Model for Special Education, 37 ExcEvnONA. CuattLR- 745 (197 1); A. YATEs, supra
note 14, at 330-31.
29. L. LipvM fs & I. GOLDBERG, RiOHr 'ro EDucATioN 6 (1973).
30. Id. at 6-7. See also Lilly, Special Education: A Teapot in a Tempest, 38 Exca'no.AL Cnn.DR 43 (1970).
31. Lilly, A Training Based Model for Special Education, 37 ExcEpnoAL CuttE 745 (1971). The zero reject
model was also called the "fail-save" model. "The 'fail' represents the system's failure to meet all childrens' needs, not
the child's. The 'save' represents the adaptation of the system to the child's individual needs and 'saves' him." Adamson
& Van Etten, Zero Reject Model Revisited: A Workable Alternative, 38 Excprno.A. CHIULmEN 735, 736 (1972).
32. Declaration of General and Special Rights of the Mentally Retarded, cited in L. Lints, & I. Goso, supra
note 29, at 7.
33. Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, cited in L. Livsiro & I. GoLDaRo, supra note 29, at
104. Also, in 1971 the Council for Exceptional Children, an organization of special education professionals, adopted the
following official policy statement:
Education is the right of all children.The principle of education for all is based on the philosophical premise of
democracy that every person is valuable in his own right and should be afforded equal opportunities to develop
his full potential. Thus, no democratic society should deny educational opportunities to any child, regardless of
his potentialities for making a contribution to society.
Basic Commitments and Responsibilities to Exceptional Children, adopted, Council for Exceptional Children Delegate
Convention, cited in 37 EXCEnoNAL CUH.DRE 181 (1971).
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educational services. 34 The classification systems, in force legislatively and ingrained
professionally, were slow to give way. In Pennsylvania, for example, the State's
1965 Mental Retardation Plan estimated that there were 70,000 to 80,000 retarded
children between the ages of five and twenty-one in the state who were denied access
to any public educational services. 35 In 1972, it was estimated that in Washington,
D.C. alone, there were 22,000 retarded, emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and
speech or learning disabled children with as many as 18,000 of these children not
being provided with any special education programs.3 6 These numbers were reflected
nationwide. As of 1972, one commentator estimated that of the approximately seven
million handicapped children of school age in the country, one million were receiving
no formal education at all and that over one half of those remaining were not
receiving any form of special educational services. 37 As a result, parents and
advocacy groups turned to the courts to secure education for all handicapped children.
B. Educability and the Courts
The judicial system also played a role in fostering the notion that certain hand-
icapped children were uneducable. Despite compulsory school attendance laws, 38
courts excluded many handicapped children from the educational system based on the
rubric of "general welfare," "rights of other children," and "discipline and progress
of the school." ' 39 Courts often viewed the presence of handicapped children in the
classroom as being disruptive and having an adverse effect on both teachers and other
students. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin permitted a school board to exclude a
physically handicapped student from a public school even though the child kept pace
with his peers. 40 The court ruled that the cerebral palsied child's drooling contributed
to an interference with the discipline and progress of the school. 41
It was not until 1954 that advocates for the handicapped received a legal basis
for future attacks on exclusionary educational policies. In that year, the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.42 Although the Court stopped short of
holding education a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, it stated that
when the state provides education to some students, the equal protection clause
required equal access to education of all students. 43
34. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1982); THE LECA. Rttrrs oF HAN.icAcEo PERsoNs, supra note 2, at 57.
35. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing the
Commonwealth's Mental Retardation Plan at 4, 92, 93, 142), modifying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
36. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).
37. Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate EducationforAll Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRAcUsE L.
REV. 1037, 1038 (1972).
38. All states except Mississippi have compulsory school attendance laws.
39. For a summary of such court decisions, see Zedler, Public Opinion and Public Education for the Exceptional
Chtld-Court Decisions 1873-1950, 19 JouRNAL or 1xcEPnoNA!. CsmtwaN 187 (1953). See also J. WA.s, supra note 10,
at 66 (citing additional cases).
40. State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919).
41. Id. at 235, 172 N.W. at 155; See also Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893)
(mentally retarded child excluded from public education because the school decided he was troublesome and could not
benefit from the instruction).
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Id. at 493.
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One of the first judicial assaults upon the educable-uneducable classification
system was in Utah. There, the court, in emphasizing the importance of an education
for all individuals, ordered two handicapped children, classified as "trainable," into
the public school system.44
The seminal case in the quest for adoption of the zero reject education concept
was Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC).45 This
case was a class action brought on behalf of all mentally retarded children in
Pennsylvania who were excluded from a public education.46 The suit directly
attacked a statutory scheme which allowed schools to exclude children deemed
uneducable or untrainable. 47 The plaintiffs argued that excluding handicapped
children from a public education, while providing such education to children who
were not handicapped, violated the equal protection clause. 48 In addition, the
plaintiffs asserted that the statutes violated due process in that they allowed exclusion
or a change in placement without notice and a hearing. 49
Knowing that this case would be watched by the mass media, the general public,
and the legislature, counsel for plaintiffs attempted to establish as clearly and forcibly
as possible that every handicapped child, without exception, can benefit from
education. Counsel assembled seven of the top professionals in the field to testify on
the educability of handicapped children.50 On August 12, 1971, the witnesses were
presented in a preliminary hearing before a three judge federal court panel. After only
four of the witnesses had testified, counsel for the defendants agreed that no further
testimony would be needed to establish plaintiffs' assertions.
5
'
Witnesses for the plaintiffs established the importance of education for retarded
children and, more importantly, emphasized in no uncertain terms that all children can
be educated. 52 The expert testimony established such facts as that among every thirty
retarded children, with an appropriate program of education, twenty-nine can achieve
self-sufficiency: twenty-five of them in the ordinary way in the marketplace and four
44. Wolf v. Legislature of Utah, Civ. No. 182646 (3d Dist. Utah Jan. 8, 1969), cited in Burgdorf & Burdorf,
supra note 2, at 876 & n. 123.
45. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
46. 343 F. Supp. 279, 281-82 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
47. The four statutory provisions that were attacked were: (1) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1304 (Purdon 1962)
(allowing the State Board of Education to exclude any child who had not attained a mental age of five); (2) PA. STAT. Am'.
tit. 24, § 13-1326 (Purdon 1962) (interpreted to allow the postponement of admitting retarded students until the
chronological age of eight); (3) PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 24, § 13-1330 (Purdon 1962) (excusing from compulsory school
attendance any child who had been determined by a school psychologist to be unable to profit from public school
attendance); (4) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Purdon 1962) (excusing the State Board of Education from providing
services to any child deemed uneducable by a school psychologist).
48. 343 F. Supp. 279, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
49. Id. at 283.
50. These witnesses were: Ignacy Goldberg, Teachers College, Columbia University; James Gallager, former
director of the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped; Donald Stedman, University of North Carolina; Burton Blatt,
Syracuse University; Allen Crocker, Children's Hospital Medical Center, Boston; Jean Hebeler, University of Maryland;
Gunnar Dybwad, Brandeis University. Gilhool, Education an Inalienable Right, 39 ExcapmoAL. CHa.UREN 597, 603-04
(1973).
51. L. LiPpMiAN & I. GOLDsRo, supra note 29, at 29; Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
52. This assertion of educability was not really contested by state officials. It was discovered that ten days before
the trial, officials of both the State Bureau of Education and Department of Public welfare admitted to the Attorney
General that the educability of all children could not be disputed. See Gilhool, supra note 50, at 604.
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in a sheltered environment. The remaining one of every thirty is capable of achieving
a significant degree of self-care.5 3 The experts also showed how the single I.Q. test
score was not an accurate measurement of a child's potential and that the labels used
as a result of this one score had a stigmatizing effect on the child.5 4 It was also
established that handicapped children should receive educational services at the earliest
possible age. 55
The PARC case resulted in a consent agreement explicitly noting that all
mentally retarded persons are educable.5 6 In addition, the Commonwealth affirmed
its obligation to provide every mentally retarded child with an educational program
appropriate to the child's needs. 57
PARC was succeeded by a similar action in the District of Columbia, Mills v.
Board of Education.5 8 This action was brought on behalf of all children with various
handicapping conditions who were excluded from a public education as opposed to
the class in PARC who represented only the mentally retarded. As in PARC, counsel
for plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that all handicapped children can benefit
from an educational programA9 Before the final court opinion was issued, the District
of Columbia Board of Education formally adopted a resolution stating in part: "[E]v-
eryone is entitled to a free publicly supported education suited to his needs, regardless
of the degree of his mental, physical or emotional disability or impairment, and
regardless of where he lives.' 60 Relying on the equal protection clause, the court
ordered the District of Columbia to provide to each child of school age a free and
suitable publicly supported education regardless of the degree of the child's disabil-
ity.6t The court also provided for a number of procedural safeguards relying on the
due process clause. 62 The court further held that exclusion on the basis of insufficient
resources would not be acceptable, stating:
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are
needed and desirable in the system then the available funds must be expended equitably in
53. 343 F. Supp. 279, at 296 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see also Gilhool, The Central Role of Fact in the Law, in THE
MErrLY RErRDE Crz AND "Em Lw 179-80 (1976) (elaborating on evidence introduced in the case).
54. 343 F. Supp. at 295.
55. See L. Lus'rswA & I. GOLDBERG, supra note 29, at 29.
56. 343 F. Supp. 279, 28748 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
57. Id. at 296. The consent agreement received final approval by court order on May 5, 1972. Thus, the court did
not have to reach the constitutional issues presented. However, the court did state that by stigmatizing a child through
exclusion, due process could be violated without notice and a hearing. Id. at 295. The court also commented that it was
doubtful that there is even a rational basis for excluding mentally retarded children from a public education. Id. at 297.
58. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
59. E.g., Affidavit of Erwin Friedman, Ph.D., in 2 LEoA Romrs OF THE MENTALLY HANicArPED 951 (1973) (stating:
I cannot overemphasize the importance of a structured educational program for the severely retarded. Such a
program in my experience can change the nature of the individual's life in the most fundamental way. We have
taken young adults, severe retardates who have spent all their lives in institutions and taught them to become
self-sufficient to the degree that they can hold down simple, paying jobs in a sheltered setting, and get to and
from work on their own. I have always been disturbed by any concept of "education" that would allow these
people to be shut out from the compulsory education laws . . .
Id. at 951.
60. L. La 'Nzi & I. GoLDBR, supra note 29, at 50.
61. 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
62. Id. at 880-84.
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such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education
consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. 63
Thus, the court emphatically expanded the zero reject model of special education to
all handicapped children regardless of the type of handicap.
PARC and Mills were catalysts for numerous similar lawsuits brought around the
country. 64 In Lebanks v. Spears,65 a federal court in Louisiana adopted the zero reject
policy in approving a consent decree which mandated suitable public education for all
retarded children up to the point of self-sufficiency or employability. An Alabama
federal court in Wyatt v. Stickney66 extended the right to education to the institution-
alized regardless of the degree of handicap. The North Dakota Supreme Court also
adopted the zero reject model using both the state and federal constitutions as a
basis. 67
Perhaps the most explicit judicial attack on educational categorizations exclud-
ing some handicapped children from educational services was Maryland Association
for Retarded Children v. State.68 In this case, the court held that one cannot
distinguish between the classifications of "education" and "training" stating: "A
child may be trained to read or write, or may be educated to read and write. A child
may be educated to tie his own shoes or trained to tie his shoes. Every type of training
is at least a sub-category of education." '69
The dramatic increase in zero reject education cases spurred state. legislation in
the area. By 1973, states such as Rhode Island, North Dakota, Wisconsin,
Tennessee, and Indiana had statutorily adopted the zero reject model. 70 Indeed, in
1971, only seven states had legislation requiring education for certain types of
handicapped children. 7 1 However, by 1975, forty-one states had enacted legislation
requiring provision of educational services to handicapped children.72
C. The Zero Reject Model and the EAHCA
Both the language of the EAHCA and its legislative history clearly show that
Congress was in agreement with the widespread professional and judicial acceptance
of the zero reject special education model. The Act's opening provision states in part:
"It is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all handicapped children have
63. Id. at 876.
64. Many of these cases axe cited in Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 878 n. 136.
65. 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973).
66. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), on submission of proposed standards by defendants, 334 F. Supp. 1341,
supplement, 344 F. Supp. 373 and 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974) (The court relied on the equal protection clauses of the state and
federal constitutions and the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the state constitution. Id. at 447.).
68. Eq. No. 1001182/77676 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore County, Md. May 3, 1974), cited in Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra
note 2, at 878 & n.136.
69. Id. at 4-5. See also J. WAu^ , supra note 10, at 65 ("In point of fact, there is no sharp distinction between
trainability and educability; there are varying degrees of trainability just as there are varying degrees of educability, and
nowhere is there a sharp schism between different leaming processes.").
70. See Wald, The Right to Education, 2 LEoAL RIGms OF THE MENTAU.Y HANDICAPPE 831 (1973).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
72. See SENAT REPORT, supra note 5, at 1432.
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available to them... a free appropriate public education .... ,,73 The Act requires
that a state, in order to receive federal financial assistance, must demonstrate that it
"has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free
appropriate public education." 74 The Act goes on to require a state to identify, locate,
and evaluate all handicapped children residing within its boundaries "regardless of
the severity of their handicap." 75
The Act's very broad definition of "handicapped children" 76 also indicates
Congress' acceptance of the zero reject approach. The definition encompasses
children suffering from the most serious of handicapping conditions including
schizophrenia 77 and multihandicapping disabilities. 78 In addition, Congress set up a
prioritizing scheme for providing educational services under the Act. 79 Children
having first priority are those excluded from public educational services.80 Generally,
these are the most seriously handicapped, previously excluded by their categorization
as uneducable. Next in line for services are "handicapped children, within each
disability, with the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate
education .... ,181
The legislative history of the EAHCA reinforces the assertion that Congress
adopted the zero reject model. Congress was well aware of the major right-to-
education cases which judicially enforced the zero reject policy.8 2 Indeed, these cases
played a large role in persuading Congress to act in the area. 83 In the Senate Report,
Congress specifically took note of the PARC and Mills cases stating that the "right
to education is no longer in question. ' ' 84
The Act's legislative history also emphasizes statistics showing that there were
still many handicapped children who were excluded from the public education
system. 85 In noting these statistics, Senator Williams stated: "While much progress
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982).
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (1982).
76. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. In 1985) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1987).
77. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)(ii) (1987).
78. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(5) (1987).
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1982).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1430.
83. See id. at 1429 (stating: "Increased awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children and landmark
court decisions establishing the right to education for handicapped children pointed to the necessity of an expanded Federal
fiscal role."). See also 121 CoNG. REc. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Schweiker) ("This measure is the result of many
court decisions, including the historic right to education consent agreement between the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Persons and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. ... ).
84. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1430. The Senate Report went on to note that the 1974 Education
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579-85 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)), which were the basis for the EAHCA, "incorporated the major principles of the right to education
cases." SENATE R vsorr, supra note 5, at 1430. See also 120 CoNG. REc. 4212, 4313 (daily ed. May 21, 1974) (statement
of Rep. Vanik) ("There have been 36 court cases in 24 states on the ight to education for all handicapped children ....
In those cases which have been decided, judgments have been given-as they should be-in favor of the handicapped
children and their parents."). See also 121 CoNG. REc. 37023, 37025 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas) ("there have
been landmark judicial decisions in which the courts have recognized the rights of each handicapped child to have a free
appropriate public education. Thus far there have been some 46 court cases regarding the right to an education for each
handicapped child.").
85. See SENATE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 1432 (noting that:
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has been made in the last few years, we can take no solace in that progress until all
handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an education.''86 This concern with
children excluded from public educational services is exemplified throughout the
Act's legislative history. 87 Such concern shows that Congress was intent on providing
educational services to these excluded children, regardless of the severity of their
handicaps. 88
The vast majority of courts interpreting the EAHCA have also recognized that
the Act embraces the zero reject education concept. In Board of Education v.
Rowley, 89 the United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to interpret the
Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education." In so doing, the Court
repeatedly emphasized that Congress intended to provide access to educational
services for all handicapped children. 90 Other federal courts have been just as explicit
in holding that the Act embodies the zero reject policy. In Kruelle v. New Castle
County School District,91 the Third Circuit mandated educational services for a
profoundly retarded child who suffered from cerebral palsy and emotional problems.
In addition, the child could not speak and lacked self-help skills. In requiring services
for this child-who would certainly have been deemed uneducable under the previous
classification systems92-- the court stated: "The Education Act unqualifiedly pro-
vides for a free appropriate education for all handicapped children, 'regardless of the
severity of their handicap.'-93 Likewise, in Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent
School District,94 a Texas district court required services for a schizophrenic child
stating that "Itihe language and legislative history of that Act simply do not admit of
the possibility that some children may be beyond the reach of our educational
of the more than 8 million children (between birth and twenty-one years of age) with handicapping conditions
requiring special education and related services, only 3.9 million such children are receiving an appropriate
education. 1.75 million handicapped children are receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million
handicapped children are receiving an inappropriate education.).
86. 121 CONG. REc. 19478, 19486 (1975).
87. E.g., 121 CoNG. REc. 19487, 19491 (1975) (Sen. Williams introducing tables showing a state-by-state
breakdown of excluded and inappropriately served handicapped children); 121 CoNG. REc. 19502 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Cranston) ("the right to a free appropriate education ... has not been extended universally in our country. Some 7.8
million children ... are largely excluded from the educational opportunities that we give to our other children. They are
children with physically and emotionally handicapping conditions. ... ); 121 CoNG. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Schweiker) ("a total of 1.75 million handicapped children are receiving no educational services at all."); 121 CoNG.
Rec. 19505 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("There are approximately 8 million handicapped children . . . in this
country. Over a million of these children receive no educational opportunities whatsoever.").
88. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. 37418 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Cranston) ("Some 8 million children who fall within
this age group are largely excluded from the educational opportunities that we give most other children because of their
handicapping conditions. It is these children to which this legislation is directed, and it is these children who will benefit
so greatly by Senate approval of the conference report."); 121 CoNo. REC. 19505 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("I
believe a profound injustice has been suffered by these handicapped children of school age who are excluded from public
schools.").
89. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
90. In emphasizing congressional intent to provide access to educational services for all handicapped children, the
Court made such remarks as: "The face of the statute evidences a congressional intent to bring previously excluded
handicapped children into the public education systems of the States ..... Id. at 189; "By passing the Act, Congress
sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children." Id. at 192; "[Aiccess to an 'education'
for handicapped children is precisely what Congress sought to provide in the Act." Id. at 203.
91. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
92. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
93. 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(c) (1976)).
94. 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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expertise." 95 Similarly, in Matthews v. Campbell,96 a Virginia district court reasoned
that the Act does not contemplate the possibility that there are children who cannot
benefit from educational services. 97
The Act's language, its legislative history, and judicial interpretations evidence
that the zero reject special educational model, wherein no child is deemed
uneducable, is at the core of its philosophy.
I1. THE EAHCA
Despite the widespread professional acceptance of the zero reject model and the
onslaught of right-to-education cases enforcing it, by 1975 there were still 1.75
million handicapped children deprived of any educational services, with another 2.5
million children receiving educational services inappropriate to their needs. 98
Congress noted that the lack of financial resources was preventing states from
complying with the mandates of the right-to-education cases. 99 To assist the states,
Congress expanded the federal fiscal role through enactment of Public Law 94-142,
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 100 The Act is primarily a
funding statute with comprehensive requirements that a state must comply with in
order to receive financial assistance.10'
The heart of the Act is the requirement that each participating state l0 2 provide a
"free and appropriate public education" (FAPE) to all handicapped children 0 3
within its jurisdiction. 10 4 However, the Act does not set out the specific services
necessary to constitute a FAPE. Instead, the Act requires that the handicapped child's
teacher, parents, other professionals, and, when appropriate, the child himself,
convene to develop an "individualized education program" (IEP) for the child. 05
The IEP includes a written statement of the present level of the child's educational
performance, his annual and short-term instructional objectives, evaluation proce-
dures to be used to determine his progress, and, most importantly, the specific
educational services to be offered the child and the setting in which they are to be
provided. 10 6 Thus, the responsibility for defining the scope of educational services to
be offered a child is, at least in the first instance, with school district officials and the
95. Id. at 879.
96. 1979-40 Entc. oF THE HAnDIcAPPE L. REP. 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 1979) [hereinafter EHLR].
97. Id. at 551:266.
98. See SENATE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 1432.
99. Id. at 1431.
100. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1400-1401, 1405-1406,
1411-1420, 1453 (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985)).
101. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. For a description of federal laws relating to the education of
handicapped children in effect previous to the EAHCA, see Note, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 10 lU. Mica. J.L. REF. 110, 118-20 (1976).
102. Currently, all 50 states participate under the Act.
103. The Act contains a broad definition of handicapped children. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. II 1985) and
34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1987) (containing working definitions of the statutory classifications).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1982).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
106. Id. See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-.349 (1987) (elaborating on the statutory definition of an IEP). For a
further discussion of the IEP procedure, see Note, Education of Handicapped Children: The IEP Process and the Search
for an Appropriate Education, 56 ST. Jotn's L. REv. 81 (1981).
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child's parents. However, the proposed IEP is subject to review by local and state
hearing officers. 107 The hearing officer's decision can then be appealed to either state
or federal court. 1 0 8
Congress attempted to assist parents and educators in defining at least the broad
contours of appropriate educational services. A "free appropriate public education"
is cryptically defined as being composed of two components: "special education"
and "related services" which are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program.10 9 Special education is defined as "specially designed instruc-
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped
child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home
instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions."' 10 Related services include
"such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services... required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education. ... "M
Unfortunately, these statutory definitions are not of much assistance in deter-
mining what specific services a school district must provide under the label
"education." A close reading of the statutory provisions indicates that to be
appropriate, an educational program must, at a minimum, be designed to meet the
unique individual needs of a handicapped child. Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court recently affirmed the emphasis on individual needs in structuring the content of
an educational program. In Board of Education v. Rowley, t12 the Court defined free
appropriate public education as "educational instruction specially designed to meet
the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are
necessary to permit the child to 'benefit' from the instruction. "113 However, in
setting a standard of "some educational benefit" which each child is entitled to under
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). The Act sets forth a number of procedural safeguards for handicapped children
and their parents during the IEP process. These protections include the opportunity to examine relevant records; the right
to obtain an independent educational evaluation; the right to prior written notice of any proposed changes in evaluation,
services, or placement; and the right to file complaints that trigger the administrative due process hearing procedures. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) and (2) (1982). If the due process hearing is conducted by a local or intermediate educational unit,
it shall be subject to an independent review by the state education agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1982). See also 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.500-.514 (1987) (elaborating on the statutory procedural safeguards). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1982)
(enumerating the rights accorded to the parties during the administrative hearings).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(I)-(4) (1982). The Supreme Court has addressed the standard of review for courts under
the Act. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 (1982).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (defining free appropriate public education as "special
education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program under section 614(a)(5) [20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5)]."
110. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. 1U 1985) (defining related services as follows:
[T]ransportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical
and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only)
as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and includes the early
identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1987) (elaborating on the statutory definition of related services).
112. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
113. Id. at 188-89.
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the Act, the Court was addressing the extent and degree of services which must be
provided rather than the range or type of services a school district must provide n14
A handicapped child can present a wide variety of unique needs depending on
the severity of the handicapping condition. Consequently, a broad array of services
are often required to meet such needs. The vagueness of the statutory language has
fostered debate on the range of unique needs which must be served by school districts
as "educational needs" under the Act. Some argue educational needs are broad in
scope requiring school districts to provide an extensive array of both instructional and
noninstructional services while others have taken a much narrower view of the
services a school district must provide under the rubric of "appropriate educa-
tion." 1 15 That is, while admittedly a handicapped child may present a broad array of
needs, only a limited number of them qualify as "educational" in nature.
These conflicting views have led to disputes between parents and school districts
over what services must be included in a child's IEP. These disputes often end up in
state or federal court where a judge is required to determine the specific services
necessary to constitute a "free appropriate public education." 1 1 6 Judicial resolutions
of these conflicts have varied. The lack of uniformity is especially evident when
expensive, nontraditional types of services, such as residential placements, have been
at issue. Results of these cases often depend on how the particular court defines the
concept of education as used in the Act. The broader the court interprets education,
the more services it is likely to require as part of an appropriate public educational
program. Thus, it would seem that the first step in reaching a uniform resolution to
these disputes is to determine the proper scope of education.
IV. THE DEFINITION OF EDUCATION
A. Judicial Interpretations of Education
The functioning of a democratic society is dependent on an effective educational
system. Education gives the citizenry the opportunity to acquire the skills necessary
to conduct the process of self-government. " 7 As the New Jersey Supreme Court has
stated, education is necessary to prepare children to function politically, economi-
cally, and socially in a democratic society." 8 Thus, even outside the special
education context, notions of public education have included more than mere training
in academics." 9 Traditional curricula emphasizing instruction in the "three R's"
114. The Rowley decision has generated a substantial amount of commentary. See, e.g., Myers & Jenson, The
Meaning of "Appropriate" Educational Programming Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 1984 S.
Iti. U.L.J. 401; Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and
Raising the Floor, 42 Mo. L. REv. 466 (1983); Note, Board of Education v. Rowley: Landmark Roadblock or Another
Signpost on the Road to State Courts, 16 Coss. L. Rv. 149 (1983).
115. Compare Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d. Cir. 1981) with 1983-84 EHLR
Decisions 505:230 (SEA Il. Jan. 12, 1984) (name not provided), [hereinafter EHLR DEC.].
116. For a listing and description of many of these cases, see T. MARVEM, A. G~uo & J. Rocewi.i, SrmDrr
LmoATnon, A CooP-oN AND ANALYSTS OF CIVL CASES INVOLVING STUDMors 1977-1981 (1982).
117. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
118. Levine v. Institutions & Agencies Dep't, 84 N.J. 234, 247, 418 A.2d 229, 236 (1980).
119. A review of judicial interpretations of education reflects this fact. E.g., Young v. Linwood School Dist., 193
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have been expanded to include such areas as home economics, physical education,
driver training, sex education, job skill training, and other nonacademic subjects.
In a democracy, however, the purpose of education is not limited to merely
equipping children to participate in the political, economic, and social processes.
This limited view of education was the justification used by at least one court for
excluding certain handicapped children from public educational services. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in Levine v. Institution & Agencies Department of New
Jersey120 relied on such an interpretation in holding that profoundly retarded children,
categorized as sub-trainable under the state legislative scheme, can be excluded from
public educational services under the state constitution. The court reasoned that
because these children were not likely to achieve any degree of personal indepen-
dence, nor social and economic usefulness, public educational services would be
wasted on them. 121
In effect, the Levine court equated the concept of education with political,
economic, and social usefulness to society. However, such a restricted view of
education is actually antithetical to a democratic view of an individual's worth in
society. As the Council for Exceptional Children noted:
The principle of education for all is based on the philosophical premise of democracy that
every person is valuable in his own right and should be afforded equal opportunities to
develop his full potential. Thus, no democratic society should deny educational opportuni-
ties to any child, regardless of his potentialities for making a contribution to society. 12
In a democracy, an individual's worth is not solely measured by his contribution
to the societal machinery. Instead, each individual is respected as a human being and,
as Judge Pashman asserted in a dissenting opinion in Levine, "it is by education that
each of us ... attains the full measure of the humanity we possess."' 23 As Judge
Pashman further stated:
I cannot accept a definition of education which does not provide to each child the training
and assistance necessary to function as best they can in whatever will be their environment-
even if that environment will be insulated from the world of politics and economic
competition .... The differences in the capacity to benefit from education among mentally
impaired children are assuredly differences in degree. But because of their shared humanity,
they cannot be considered differences in kind.124
Ark. 82, 85, 97 S.W.2d 627, 629 (1936) ("we think it just as important that children should be developed physically and
morally as it is that they should be developed mentally."); Dodge v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 298 Ky. 1, 5, 181
S.W.2d 406, 408 (1944) ("education may, in the common acceptation of the word, be particularly directed to
development of either mental, moral or physical powers, but in its broadest and best sense, embraces them all."); German
Gymnastics Ass'n v. City of Louisville, 117 Ky. 958, 961, 80 S.W. 201, 201 (1904) ("The cultivation of the mind, the
improvement of our moral and religious natures, and the development of our physical faculties are necessary to a perfected
education."); see also 14 WoRDs & PHRmes 123-27 (1952) (collecting definitions of education).
120. 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980).
121. Id. at 250, 418 A.2d at 237 (1980).
122. Position paper adopted by the Council for Exceptional Children in April 1971, reprinted in L. LtmLN & I.
GoLDBERG, supra note 29, at 87 [hereinafter Position Paper].
123. 84 N.J. 234, 269, 418 A.2d 229, 247 (1980) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 275, 418 A.2d at 250-51 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Fortunately, the limited objective of education applied by the Levine court has
not gained any degree of acceptance by courts or professional educators. The United
States Supreme Court took a more expansive view in Wisconsin v. Yoder'25 and
defined an appropriate education as that which prepares a child for life in the
particular community setting in which the child will live. 126 Under this reasoning, it
is possible to state that the primary purpose of education is to serve the individual
child as opposed to serving society by enabling the child to contribute to the state
politically, economically, and socially. This reasoning suggests that even if a
handicapped child is not expected to progress beyond a sheltered setting, the child
would still be entitled to an education geared to meet the individual's needs for life
in such a setting. As noted earlier, 2 7 an Alabama federal court in Wyatt v. Stickney 2 8
held that even those individuals who were handicapped severely enough to require
institutionalization were entitled to education suited to their needs.
Other courts have been just as explicit in broadly interpreting the concept of
education. In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,129 a Pennsylvania
district court equated education with habilitation, the purpose of which is to maximize
the development of retarded individuals without a qualification that the development
reach a certain level.' 30 Likewise, the court in Fialkowski v. Shapp 31 took an
expansive view of education, noting that profoundly retarded children require formal
educational services which are geared to their individual needs.' 3 2 The court included
in its definition of education the teaching of skills and knowledge which
nonhandicapped children develop and learn informally. 33 Perhaps the clearest
judicial statement of the wide scope of education was by a New York family court in
In re Tracy Ann Cox,' 34 holding that education included such services as teaching the
handicapped child how to hold a spoon and feed herself, how to dress, go to the
bathroom, psychological and psychiatric treatment, and speech therapy.' 35
B. Professional Interpretations of Education
Professionals in both the fields of handicaps and education have likewise given
a broad interpretation to the concept of education. The Council for Exceptional
Children stated:
The fundamental purposes of Special Education are the same as those of regular education:
the optimal development of the individual as a skillful, free, and purposeful person, able to
125. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126. Id. at 222.
127. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
128. 344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, rev'd in part, sub. nom., Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
129. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd in part and
remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
130. Id. at 1298.
131. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
132. Id. at 959.
133. Id.
134. No. H-4721-75 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Queens County Apr. 18, 1976), cited in R. MARTN, EDUCATING HANDiCAPED
Crnwtan; TE LE GAL MANDATE, 13 (1979).
135. Id.
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plan and manage his own life and to reach his highest potential as an individual and as a
member of society. Indeed, Special Education developed as a set of highly specialized areas
of education in order to provide exceptional children with the same opportunities as other
children for a meaningful, purposeful, and fulfilling life. 36
Such an interpretation of education stresses the expansion of services beyond the
teaching of mere academics to include services geared toward meeting the individual
needs of the child as a total human being. As the Council went on to state: "The focus
of all education should be the unique learning needs of the individual child, and of
the child as a total functioning organism."1 37
Another professional emphasized the broad array of services necessary to an
appropriate education when he stated:
Education has to be defined in the broad sense as a process whereby a child learns to live
in his environment through the acquisition of knowledge and skills. Thus, to teach a child
to eat, use the toilet, walk on the streets, avoid dangers, and to get along in a social setting
with others is a major educational achievement. Toilet training, for example, is a much
greater educational "threshold" than the completion of a four year undergraduate program;
and the fact that this sort of learning might be labeled "habit training" in no way makes it
any less "education" than training an individual to manipulate abstract symbols, which is
what reading and writing really is. . . . 3
By focusing on the unique learning needs of each handicapped child, the type of
educational services provided must be expanded beyond those needed to educate
nonhandicapped children. Without specialized services geared to the particular needs,
allowing the handicapped child mere access to the public school system is
meaningless. In Lau v. Nichols,139 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
mere presence in a classroom does not constitute education if the child is unable to
benefit from the curriculum. 140 The Court held that the Califomia public school
system denied non-English speaking Chinese students "a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the educational program" by failure to provide English language
instruction. 141 Similarly, handicapped children need additional educational services
geared to their unique learning needs if they are to benefit from public education. This
136. See Position Paper, supra note 122, at 89. The Council went on to emphasize that education must meet the
individual needs of each child:
To Special Educators, the statements of educational goals that stress the primacy of intellectual development are
inadequate. They have learned from their experiences with children who have learning problems that so-called
"intelligent" behavior is interrelated with individual motivation, cultural values, physical competency,
self-esteem, and other non-cognitive variables.
Perhaps the most important concept that has been developed in Special Education as a result of experiences
with exceptional children, is that of the fundamental individualism of every child. The aspiration of Special
Educators is to see every child as a unique composite of potentials, abilities, and learning needs for whom an
educational program must be designed to meet his particular needs.
Id.
137. Id. at 90.
138. Affidavit of Erwin Friedman, Ph.D., reprinted in 2 LEoA MGrs oF Tim MEMNALLY HAND:CAPPED 951 (1973).
139. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
140. Id. at 568. Accord Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
141. 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
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problem was addressed by a Pennsylvania court in Frederick L. v. Thomas. 142 In
holding that learning disabled children were entitled to instruction specially geared to
their handicaps, the court stated:
Many of the plaintiffs, it is said, cannot derive any educational benefit from the normal
curriculum if that experience is not mediated by special instruction aimed at their learning
handicaps. We are told that inappropriate educational placements predictably lead to severe
frustration and to other emotional disturbances which impede the learning and erupt into
antisocial behavior. On this basis it is argued that some or all of the class is constructively
excluded from public educational services, because-for them-the instruction offered is
virtually useless, if not positively harmful.' 43
Nonhandicapped children learn and develop many of their primary skills such as
self-help skills, oral communication, and appropriate social skills in a rather
haphazard fashion outside the formal educational environment. The severely handi-
capped child, on the other hand, may need additional instruction in a formalized
structured environment in order to learn many of the skills other children develop
through the normal socialization process. 44 The more handicapped the child, the
more traditional educational instruction and services need to be expanded. As one
group of professionals stated:
When one talks about curriculum for the severely handicapped child, one talks about a
curriculum as comprehensive as life itself. It must not only teach the child to live as
effectively as possible in his environment, but must provide the most basic of teaching
sequences in self-help, language and motor skills.' 45
On the other hand, children with mild handicapping conditions will require less
in the way of additional and different educational services. Just as the ordinary
educational curriculum has increasingly emphasized the practical aspects of life,
many handicapped children will benefit more from a program emphasizing practical
skills needed to live in the community. This can include more attention to
prevocational and vocational preparation as well as development of social skills.146
In reality, the "additional" and "different" educational services required by
handicapped children are different only in degree from those provided children in
general. As one commentator notes:
Teaching a child to walk is not functionally different from driver training; both are about
mobility. Teaching a child to feed himself is not functionally different from health, hygiene,
or home economics. Toilet training is not functionally different from the self-control and
self-care taught in health, hygiene, or physical education.' 47
142. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
143. Id. at 835. See also J. \VALL N, supra note 10, at 52-53 (Emphasizing that appropriate education consists of
individualized services. He states, "the problem is to devise the most effective and the least objectionable means of
adapting curricula and educational procedures to meet the individual pupil's present stage of development, conditions,
needs, and potentialities, to the end that he may achieve maximum growth, development, and self-realization and
maximum social, civic, and occupational adjustment.").
144. See supra note 59; Gilhool, supra note 53, at 187.
145. Fredericks, Baldwin, Grove, Riggs, Furey & Moore, Curriculum for the Severely Handicapped, 12 Enuc. &
TRwo oF "am MENrAu. Rzmern 316 (Dec. 1977).
146. See Roos, supra note 17, at 51-59.
147. Gilhool, supra note 53, at 184-85.
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And yet, without such educational services, many handicapped children cannot
benefit from public education. Indeed, mere access to the classroom, without more,
may be harmful to these children. All children need love, security, recognition, and
a sense of belonging. When a handicapped child is placed in a classroom with none
of the supportive services required to understand and benefit from the situation, the
child will fail and be classified as different and incompetent both by teachers and
peers. This environment of rejection can only cause frustration and reinforce negative
self-opinion. This situation may give rise to secondary characteristics to the primary
handicapping condition, often in the form of acting-out behavior which further
impedes the child's ability to learn. 148
Additional educational services geared to unique needs are even more important
when dealing with the most severely handicapped children. Two of the most valued
rights in a democratic society are life and liberty.149 Without specialized services,
severely handicapped children risk losing their liberty and, in some cases, their lives.
Without appropriate education, custodial institutionalization is required for some
children, and they are denied the opportunity to learn basic self-help and danger-
avoidance skills, increasing the chances of untimely death.150
Thus, the very values at the heart of our democratic philosophy demand an
appropriate education for every child, handicapped as well as nonhandicapped. As
courts and professionals have recognized, the purpose of education is broad, dictating
a wide array of services designed to meet the unique needs of each child. Indeed, the
general educational statutes of most states refer to the public educational system's
responsibility to address individual needs. 151
C. Education and the EAHCA
Congress, following previous case law and professional opinion, adopted a
broad definition of education when enacting the EAHCA. This intent is manifested
by the Act's language, its legislative history, and court opinions interpreting the Act.
As stated earlier, although the Act requires a free appropriate public education
for every handicapped child, Congress did not set out the specific services necessary
to constitute such an education. This is consistent with Congress' emphasis on
individualized programming throughout the Act. An appropriate education is
composed of "special education" and "related services" that are provided in
conformity with an individualized education program. 152 The special education
component is defined as "specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child . . . . -153 This language suggests that the types of
instruction necessary under the label of education be expansive enough to meet the
wide range of special needs presented by children with handicapping conditions of
148. See S. SSEAL, No CmwL is INEoucAsLE 87-88 (1974); S. KiRK & G. JoHNsoN, EDUCATwc TE Remsnm CHila 324
(1951).
149. U.S. Co.er. amend. XIV, § 1.
150. Gilhool, supra note 50, at 603.
151. For examples of such state statutes, see Gilhool, supra note 53, at 184 n.40.
152. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
153. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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varying degrees. Likewise, the related services component is very comprehensive.
Such services, required under the label of education, can include transportation,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, counseling,
and social work services. 154 Both components of an appropriate education under the
Act demonstrate Congress' broad interpretation of the concept of education.
Congress' expansive view of education is also exemplified by the Act's
definition of "handicapped children." Its broad coverage extends to the retarded,
hard of hearing and deaf, speech-impaired, visually handicapped, orthopedically
impaired, seriously emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, other health impaired,
and multihandicapped. t55 This definition can include children who are profoundly
retarded, the autistic, the schizophrenic, those suffering from two or more handicap-
ping conditions such as the deaf-blind, and even those who are depressed or who
exhibit inappropriate behaviors. 5 6 Such a wide range of conditions underscores the
broad array of services which may be required by the Act under the label of education
to meet the various unique needs of children suffering from these conditions.
The legislative history of the Act also exhibits Congress' adoption of a
wide-ranging definition of education. Congress believed that by requiring a free
appropriate public education, handicapped children would achieve a greater degree of
independence, and thus become less dependent upon the state. 157 It was hoped that
many handicapped children would achieve total self-sufficiency.Ss To move towards
self-sufficiency, many severely handicapped children must begin by learning the
most basic of self-help skills such as toileting, dressing, eating, and washing. Other,
less severely handicapped children, must master additional life skills such as using
public transportation and interacting in a socially acceptable manner in the commu-
nity. Consequently, Congress viewed educational services as including much more
than academic instruction. The educational goal of increased self-sufficiency requires
that educational responsibility include a comprehensive range of services.
Nevertheless, decisionmakers at both the administrative and judicial levels
disagree on the scope of educational services which must be provided as part of a free
154. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985). The list of related services contained in the Act's statutory
and regulatory language was not intended to be exhaustive. 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (1987) (comment).
155. According to the Act, handicapped children are those who are "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education
and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1985).
156. 34 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1987).
157. See, e.g., 121 CooG. REc. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Failure to provide appropriate
educational services for all handicapped children results in public agencies and taxpayers spending billions of dollars over
the lifetime of these individuals to maintain them as dependents in minimally acceptable lifestyles."); 121 Co.o. REc.
19505 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Beall) ("In the case of a handicapped child, our failure to stimulate his or her potential
can only lead to despair and dependence on the part of the handicapped individual, and this dependence will inevitably
be funded by the American public.").
158. See, e.g., 121 CONG. Rac. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[Providing appropriate educational
services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they will
not have to depend on subsistence payments from public funds."); 121 Co.G. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Mondale quoting State Senator Jerome Hughes) ("We can easily see that for every child we serve educationally we have
developed a more self-sufficient individual who will need fewer state services . . . we have helped an individual become
a part of our community."). See also Weiker, The Need for a Strong Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 14
Co.N. L. REv. 471, 472 (1982) (noting Congress' recognition of the potential productivity of handicapped children).
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appropriate public education under the Act. 159 On the other hand, many such
decisionmakers have simply taken for granted that, for the handicapped, a wide
variety of services must be considered a part of education.
In holding that each child is entitled to receive educational benefit from services
under the Act, the United States Supreme Court in Rowley stressed the importance of
looking at individual needs in formulating the child's educational program. 16 The
Court refused to "establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational
benefits," 161 but noted favorably the congressional intent that handicapped children
be enabled to increase their self-sufficiency. 62 Though implying that self-sufficiency
would be an appropriate goal for some children, 163 the Court refused to set
self-sufficiency as the standard required by the Act for all children. The Court noted
that for some mildly handicapped children the goal of self-sufficiency would be
inadequate while for some severely handicapped children, it would be overdemand-
ing.164 This emphasis on individual levels and needs as well as the Court's references
to self-sufficiency evidence its view that an appropriate educational program must
include a broad range of services. 165
Other courts have been even more explicit in recognizing the variety of services
necessary to meet the individual educational needs of handicapped children. Courts
have not hesitated to strike down state policies violating the Act's emphasis on
meeting individual needs. For example, the practice of limiting the school year to 180
days has been struck as violating the need of some handicapped children for
year-round services.166 One court, in requiring a twenty-four hour structured program
emphasizing training in basic self-help skills for a profoundly retarded multihandi-
capped child, stated: "[T]he concept of education is necessarily broad with respect to
[such persons].''167 Another court, in addressing the education of the severely
emotionally disturbed and the severely and profoundly retarded, stated: "Where basic
self-help and social skills such as toilet training, dressing, feeding, and communi-
cation are lacking, formal education begins at that point.' 1 68 Likewise, the Sixth
159. See supra note 116.
160. See supra note 113.
161. The Court stated:
We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determing the adequacy of educational benefits conferred
upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is
receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the
regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that situation.
458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982).
162. Id. at 201 n.23.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 202 n.23.
165. In commenting on the various unique needs presented by different handicapped children, the Court remarked
It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those
obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between. One child may have little difficulty
competing successfully in an academic setting with nonhandicapped children while another child may encounter
great difficulty in acquiring even the most basic of self-maintenance skills.
Id. at 202.
166. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1980); Georgia Ass'n of
Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
167. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981).
168. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Circuit emphasized the acquisition of social skills as education. 169 Indeed, one court
deemed a summer enrichment program consisting of such activities as camping, field
trips, swimming and other sports, playground and recreational activities, gardening,
and work skills training as education for an autistic child.170
Courts asked to interpret the "related services" component of a free appropriate
public education have also held a number of nontraditional services as part of an
appropriate education. The provision of psychotherapy has been held a component
of an emotionally disturbed child's educational program.17' The United States
Supreme Court required the provision of clean intermittent catheterization under the
related services component of an educational program for a child suffering spina
bifida so that she could remain in the public school classroom. 172 Other related
services held to constitute "education" under the Act have included transportation to
and from school; 173 an air-conditioned classroom for a multihandicapped child who
could not adequately regulate his body temperature;' 74 and assistance with a
tracheotomy tube.175
In sum, the Act's unconditional language, its legislative history, and court and
administrative opinions requiring a wide variety of both instructional and
noninstructional services strongly indicate that Congress intended a very broad view
of education when enacting the EAHCA.
V. RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENTS: THE ULTIMATE EDUCATIONAL VERSUS
NONEDUCATIONAL CONTROVERSY
Despite the wide acceptance of both the zero reject educational model and a
broad definition of the concept of education, views continue to vary on the range of
services required under the EAHCA. Not surprisingly, the split of authority is most
pronounced when very expensive services are at issue. The service giving rise to the
most debate and resulting litigation is the residential placement. 176
A residential placement is one of the most nontraditional and costly services
that a school district can be asked to provide under the label "education." 177 These
twenty-four hour, highly structured intensive programs are composed not only of an
169. Ronker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
170. Birmingham and Lamphere School Dist. v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 120 Mich. App. 465,467, 328
N.W.2d 59, 60 (1982).
171. In re the "A" Family, 184 Mont. 145, 602 P.2d 157 (1979). Accord T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp.
420 (D.N.J. 1983); B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. I. 1980).
172. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984). Accord Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665
F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981).
173. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. In
1985) (transportation expressly stated as a related service).
174. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
175. Department of Educ. v. D., 531 F. Supp. 517 (D.C. Haw. 1982).
176. This debate has been carried over into scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Mooney & Aronson, Soloman
Revisited: Separating Educational and Other Than Educational Needs in Special Educational Residential Placements, 14
Co',. L. REv. 531 (1982); Stoppleworth, Mooney & Aronson Revisited: A Less than Solomon-Like Solution to the
Problem of Residential Placement of Handicapped Children, 15 Co.". L. Rev. 757 (1983).
177. See, e.g., Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Board, 744 F.2d 514, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1984) (commenting on
residential placement that would cost approximately $88,000 a year); Stanger v. Ambach, 501 F. Supp. 1237, 1241-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (remarking on residential placement that would cost $53,382 a year).
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instructional component, 78 but often include custodial, psychological, medical,
social, recreational, and other related services as part of their total package. 179
The Act's regulatory language contemplates provision of a residential placement
as part of an appropriate education. 180 To be eligible, as with any service, a child
must first meet the Act's definition of "handicapped." 181 This determination requires
the following three-step analysis:
1) It must first be established that a child suffers from one of the eleven broad
categories of impairments set forth and defined in the Act and its regulations.
1 82
2) Next, it must be shown that the impairment(s) the child suffers from adversely
affects the child's educational performance.18 3 This requirement is often a source of
conflict. Like the concept of education, "educational performance" is not defined by
the Act. Some school authorities, wanting to limit their responsibility, argue that
"educational performance" is limited to performance within the classroom or, even
more narrowly, performance in academic tasks.184 Advocates for the child are likely
to take a much broader view of educational performance with an eye towards func-
tioning in the community.185
3) The third step is to demonstrate that special education and related services are
needed because of the particular impairment(s).186 There are situations when,
although a child could use and benefit from services under the Act, the need arises
from circumstances other than the child's impairment. For example, a child who
becomes significantly depressed for such a period of time that his educational
performance begins to deteriorate qualifies under the first two steps of the above
analysis. He suffers from a serious emotional disturbance-one of the impairments
listed by the Act'8 7-which is adversely affecting his education. Furthermore,
178. The Act expressly states that special education includes "[h]ome instruction, and instruction in hospitals and
institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Thus, school districts generally agree to pay for the
instructional component of a residential program.
179. See, e.g., North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 138 & n.2 (D.D.C.
1979) (describing an educational residential placement).
180. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1987).
181. The Act defines "handicapped children" at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 155.
182. See U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985); 34 C.F.R. 300.5 (1987).
183. This requirement arises from the Act's regulatory definition of each impairment. In each definition, the caveat
is included that such impairment causes educational problems, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.5(b)(2), (5), (7)(i), and (9) (1937), or
adversely affects educational performance. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.5(b)(1), (3), (4), (6), (7)(ii), (8), (10), and (11) (1987).
184. See, e.g., In re Capistrano United School Dist., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:106 (SEA Cal. June 7, 1984)
(Although all parties agreed the child has significant emotional problems outside of school, he cannot be labelled seriously
emotionally disturbed as he has the ability to control his actions and behavior in the classroom for a significant period of
time); In re K.E., 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:111 (SEA Conn. March 23, 1983) (Although diagnosed as seriously
emotionally disturbed by a psychiatrist, child is not handicapped under the Act as his behaviors occur almost exclusively
at home and in the community as opposed to the classroom).
185. See, e.g., In re Long Beach Unified School Dist., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:274 (SEA Cal. Nov. 9, 1984)
(educational performance does not mean merely academic achievement); In re Appeal of R.M., 1983-84 EHLR DEC.
505:139 (SEA Vt. April 4, 1983) (educational performance includes both independent functioning in school and in
society); Bethel (CT) Bd. of Educ., 1980 EHLR OCRICOMPLAINTS LOFS 257:55, 257:56 (OCR Letter of Finding
Nov. 27, 1979) ("Educational needs are not defined in purely academic or special education terms but include all
significant factors relating to the learning process.").
186. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985); 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1987).
187. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985); 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(8)(i)(A)-(E), (ii) (1987) (defining "seriously
emotionally disturbed" in part as: "(i) The term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics
over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects educational performance: . . .
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression").
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suppose the child's depression is the result of an abusive parent. In this case, the child
could certainly benefit from services under the Act such as a residential placement.
However, if removal from the parent would, in itself, dissipate the child's depression
and correct the corresponding poor educational performance, the child would not
meet the third requirement in qualifying as "handicapped" under the above analysis.
In this situation, the child does not need special education and related services
because of his impairment. Instead, the child merely needs removal from an abusive
home environment. In such a case, instead of the school district some other public
agency, such as the Department of Social Services, should provide the placement.t88
A child who qualifies as a "handicapped child" under the above three
requirements is entitled to services under the Act. However, to be entitled to a
residential placement, a fourth requirement contained in the Act's regulations must be
satisfied. "If placement in a public or private residential program is necessary to
provide special education and related services to a handicapped child, the program,
including non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost to the parents of
the child." ' 189
This regulation seems clear enough; if a child needs to be in a residential
program in order to receive benefit from education, 190 the program must be provided
by the school district as an educational service in itself. However, the official
comment to the regulation has served to thoroughly complicate the issue of residential
placement responsibility. The comment states in part that "[t]his requirement applies
to placemerlts which are made by public agencies for educational purposes . "... "191
This one sentence has, in many instances, served to shift the focus of inquiry from
the child's need for a residential program in order to benefit from education to the
question of whether a particular placement was made predominately for "educa-
tional" or "other than educational" reasons. In effect, the comment invites the
educational-noneducational debate when determining access to a residential program.
Neither the Act nor its regulations contain any express criteria for making this
distinction. Indeed, neither the Act nor its regulations contemplate such a dichotomy.
Disputes over responsibility for residential placements are usually motivated by
serious financial concerns. 192 Most parents cannot afford to pay for these programs.
Likewise, such placements place a heavy, if not impossible, financial burden upon
school districts. Often, to avoid residential placement costs, school districts argue
188. As one court stated, special educational services such as residential placements are not required
simply to remedy a poor home setting or to make up for some other deficit not covered by the Act. It is not the
responsibility of local officials under the Act to finance foster care as such: other resources must be looked
to . . . .Congress did not intend to burden local school committees with providing all social services to all
handicapped children.
Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227-28 (1st Cir. 1983). Accord Ahem v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902 (D. Del.
1984); In re Handicapped Child, 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:145 (SEA N.Y. Sept. 15, 1983).
189. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1987).
190. Although the regulation states that a residential placement is required under the Act when it is "necessary to
provide special education and related services," Id. (emphasis added), the Supreme Court in Rowley held that a FAPE
requires more than the mere provision of services; an appropriate education is one which confers educational benefit upon
the child. 458 U.S. 176, 200, 201 (1982).
191. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1987) (comment) (emphasis added).
192. See Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1984).
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that the child in question does not qualify as "handicapped" under the Act. For
example, school officials might narrowly define educational performance and
maintain the child does not meet the second of the Act's requirements. In addition,
school authorities may focus on the comment to the residential placement regulation
and argue that such placement, even if required, is necessary primarily for
noneducational purposes. 193
The above arguments have a common denominator: they both have a very
restricted view of the scope of educational needs and concomitant responsibilities.
The objective behind these arguments is to place the responsibility for a needed
residential placement on the parents or another public service agency. However, these
other potentially responsible parties will likely, in turn, adopt a much wider view of
the concept of education and argue the placement at issue is the responsibility of the
school district. Much too often, this administrative cycle results in either a long delay
or a complete denial of appropriate services for a very needy child. 194
Parents faced with this administrative bickering can either attempt to pay for an
appropriate placement or invoke the due process procedures of the Act. 95 Once these
procedures are invoked, the final arbiter on financial responsibility for a residential
placement is an administrative hearing officer or a judge. 196 These decisionmakers
have attempted to formulate some principled approaches for determining responsi-
bility for residential placements. However, the approaches implemented thus far have
proved unsatisfactory, serving only to foster further disputes.
VI. APPROACHES USED IN DETERMINING RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Uneducable Approach
Despite the wholesale acceptance of the zero reject special education model and
its incorporation into the EAHCA, some decisionmakers continue to deny educational
services on the ground that the handicapped children involved are uneducable. For
example, an administrative law judge in New Jersey withheld public school services
193. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Walter, 538 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (discussing an advisory
memorandum from the Ohio Department of Education to local school districts, stating in part:
It is the position of the Ohio Department of Education that it is possible to provide an appropriate educational
program for any handicapped child regardless of the severity of the handicap on a day school basis. If 24-hour
residential care is required, the need would emerge out of noneducational needs. School districts are therefore
advised that they have no obligation to provide 24-hour residential care and are not obligated to pay for such
care).
Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1222, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing Commissioner of Education's policy that
school boards need not provide residential placements for learning disabled children); Wallingford Bd. of Educ. v. State
Bd. of Educ., 1979-80 EHLR 552:305, 552:309 & n.13 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1981) (local school board arguing
residential placement for educational purposes is precluded by Connecticut policy which states in part:
Some children must be placed in a private school, hospital, or other institution for medical reasons, for
psychiatric or even 24 hour supervision in addition to their need for special education. The responsibility of the
local board for these children must be quite different than for the children the local board placed to acquire a
special education program because the board cannot provide said program.)
552:309 & n. 13 (emphasis in original).
194. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974).
195. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 2b4 (1982).
196. Id.
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from a severely retarded child because the child did not qualify as educable under the
state statutory scheme. 197 Fortunately, responsibility for the Act's requirements was
assumed by the Department of Human Services, Division of Mental Retardation,
which provided the child with educational services labeled as "habilitation" under
state law.' 98
In a recent Illinois due process review, the state hearing officer ruled that a
severely brain damaged child did not qualify as handicapped under the Act. 199 The
officer held that the impairment rendered the child uneducable and thus the
requirement of demonstrating a need for special education and related services
because of the impairment was not satisfied. 20° However, the facts of this case were
extreme in that the child was in a chronically unresponsive state with no sign of
cognitive functioning. Obviously, even the most zealous zero reject advocate would
admit that a comatose child is not able to benefit from educational services.
Nevertheless, the hearing officer, in disturbing dicta, stated:
It follows that there must be some level of functioning below which no education can
occur and none is required under the Education For All Handicapped Children Act ....
Implicit in their [zero-rejectionists] view of a comatose child is the recognition that
somewhere a line must be drawn and that children below that line can not [sic] be educated.
Everyone seems to agree that the line is actually somewhat higher than "living, human
child." 20'
The above statement demonstrates the still existing attitude that some children
cannot qualify as handicapped under the Act because they are simply too handi-
capped. Not long ago a Virginia federal court in Matthews v. Campbell 20 2 echoed this
sentiment in ordering a residential placement for a profoundly retarded child. After
noting that neither the Act nor its legislative history contemplates the possibility that
some children may be uneducable, the court, in dicta, suggested the possibility of
some "reasonable exceptions" to this absolute view.20 3
Fortunately, holdings of uneducability under the Act are extremely rare. The
widespread professional, judicial, and congressional acceptance of the zero reject
model has served to thwart the assertion of "exceptions" suggested by the Matthews
court.
B. The Separate and Balance Approach
Some decisionmakers, in determining financial responsibility for a residential
placement, undertake to separate and then balance the needs of the child. This
197. Board of Educ. of Linden v. A.Z. & L.Z., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:142 (SEA N.J. June 28, 1984).
198. The Act allows for the provision of educational services by other state or local agencies as long as these
programs are under the general supervision of the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1982).
199. 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:239 (SEA Il. Dec. 5, 1984) (name not provided).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 506:240.
202. 1979-80 EHLR DEC. 551:264 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1979).
203. Id. at 551:266 (The court expressed this sentiment while contemplating its options if the residential placement
failed to benefit the child.). It is interesting to note that the child, despite profound retardation and other serious
impairments, did indeed make substantial progress in the placement. See Matthews v. Davis, 742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir.
1984).
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approach involves an attempt to separate a child's educational needs from other needs
including those commonly referred to as medical, custodial, social, emotional, and
behavioral. 20 4 The next step is to determine which of the needs are most responsible
for necessitating the residential placement. If it is adjudged that the child's
educational needs are not primarily responsible for the placement, the school district
is not obligated under the Act. 20 5 Either the parents or the public agency having
jurisdiction over the needs deemed "primary" is looked to for the provision of the
placement.
The "separate and balance" approach is a direct result of the "educational
versus noneducational" mindset encouraged by the comment to the Act's regulatory
language regarding residential placements. There are a number of problems allocating
responsibility for such placements with this approach. It is often, if not always,
impossible to neatly draw lines between the various needs of a handicapped child and
to assign each a percentage of responsibility for placement. An insistence on this
method often forces a limited and categorical view of a handicapped child's problems
with a resulting nonrecognition of the actual scope of each need and its interrelation
with other needs.
This difficulty with the separate and balance approach is especially evident when
decisionmakers attempt to separate out a child's educational needs. Categorization
most often results in educational needs being viewed as limited to merely academic
or instructional needs. A recent Illinois due process review illustrated this problem. 20 6
The child suffered from poor impulse control, abusive behavior, self-destructive
tendencies, and an inability to interact properly with others. The needs of this
seriously emotionally disturbed child were conveniently separated into emotional,
behavioral, and educational categories. 20 7 The possible need for a residential
placement was recognized but, because the child was making some academic
progress, the hearing officer ruled placement would not be for "educational
204. After extensive review of case law involving handicapped children, it becomes obvious that these labels are
often used interchangeably and frequently cover overlapping conditions. Examples of conditions these labels may cover
include: Medical-disturbances of such nature and severity that psychiatric intervention, drug intervention, or both, or
other related services by a physician are necessary; Emotional-a hostile or distrustful view of others or the world in
general; Social-an inability to properly interact with others; Behavioral-inappropriate, aggressive, or violent acting-out
behaviors due to emotional insecurities; Custodial-a need for confinement to assure safekeeping.
205. Some state statutory schemes have been interpreted as adopting this approach also. See Mooney & Aronson,
supra note 176, at 546 & nn.70-71 (discussing six state statutes distinguishing between educational and noneducational
needs). Mooney & Aronson support the "separate and balance" approach to determining residential placement
responsibility. They go on to argue a "but for" test to determine whether educational or noneducational needs are
primary, i.e., "[w]ithout regard for a student's special education needs, would this child be placed in a residential facility
because of nees unrelated to the educational process? If the answer is in the affirmative, it is clear that a particular
residential placement has not been made for educational reasons . . . . Id. at 552. This approach does not address the
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of neatly separating a child's educational needs from other needs. In addition, even
assuming such a categorization of needs is possible in a particular case, the authors' "but for" test would allow school
districts to abdicate their responsibility under the Act in situations when both the educational and noneducational needs
require residential placement. For further criticism of this "but for" approach, see Stoppleworth, supra note 176; see also
Stark, Tragic Choices in Special Education: The Effect of Scarce Resources on the Implementation of Pub. L. No. 94-142,
14 CONN. L. REv. 477, 506 & n.129 (1982) (discussing Co-s4. GE. STAT. 10-76d(e) (1981)).
206. 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:230 (SEA 111. Jan. 12, 1984) (name not provided).
207. Id. at 505:232.
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purposes. "208 The school district was held responsible only for needs directly related
to instructional needs or manifested within the regular school day. 20 9 The hearing
officer went on to infer that due to the child's behavior, he should be the
responsibility of juvenile court authorities. 210
In another due process review, a California hearing officer took the same
approach, ruling that a seriously emotionally disturbed child did not qualify as
handicapped under the Act. 211 Even though the school district admitted the child had
significant emotional problems, because he made some academic progress and his
behavior could be controlled within the classroom for significant periods of time, his
impairments were deemed not to "adversely affect his educational performance. "212
Other decisionmakers implementing the separate and balance approach have
limited the educational needs only to problems manifested within the school
environment. This reasoning was used by the Delaware district court in Ahern v. State
Board of Education213 to deny residential placement under the Act to a
multihandicapped child with emotional problems. The child's emotional problems
were displayed through inappropriate behaviors, withdrawal when moderately
stressed, wandering from home, talking to strangers, and relating to others inappro-
priately. After hearing testimony that the child's behaviors were controlled in the
classroom and that she was making some academic progress, the court stated that the
child's emotional problems were "segregable from the learning process" and thus
residential placement was not necessary for educational purposes. 2 14 A similar result
was reached in a Connecticut administrative hearing. 215 Although all parties agreed
that the child was seriously emotionally disturbed, because his emotional problems
were manifested almost exclusively at home and in the community rather than in the
classroom, the child was held not to qualify as handicapped under the Act. 21 6
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. In re Capistrano Unified School Dist., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:106 (SEA Cal. June 7, 1984).
212. Id. at 506:108. See also Manchester Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 1980-81 EHLR 552:397 (Conn. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 22, 1981) (local school district argued that if academic remediation is possible, despite social, emotional, and
behavioral problems, a residential placement is not needed for educational purposes); In re Ashley M., 1984-85 EHLR
DEC. 506:149, 506:150-51 (SEA Ga. Oct. 3, 1984) (local school district held not responsible for residential placement
for behaviorally disturbed child when child is progressing academically. Such behavior should be dealt with through
custody by the Department of Human Resources.); Vernon Wayne N. v. Austin Indep. School Dist., 1983-84 EHLR
DEC. 505:134, 505:136 (SEA Tex. Aug. 29, 1983) (Emotionally disturbed, learning disabled child was denied residential
placement under the Act. The child rarely attended school due to runaway behavior and when in school was disruptive-
hut made some academic progress. Even though the child's emotional disturbance was cause of runaway behavior, the
school was held only responsible for providing related services within the classroom to mitigate the impact of the handicap
so that the child may receive educational benefit.).
213. 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 556:175 (D. Del. Aug. 31, 1984).
214. Id. at 556:182. Sometimes the attenuated attempt to separate educational needs from other needs leads to absurd
results. See. e.g., Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D. Conn. 1981) (overturning hearing officer's ruling
that a residential placement could not be deemed for educational purposes because it would not have been necessary "but
for" the child's handicap.). See also In re Handicapped Child, 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:145, 505:145 (SEA N.Y. Sept.
15, 1983) (overturning a local hearing officer's holding that a residential placement was not necessary for educational
purposes because the child's emotional problems were neither limited to, nor caused by the school environment).
215. In re K.E., 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:111 (SEA Conn. March 23, 1983).
216. Id. at 505:113.
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Cases like these, which limit the breadth of educational needs solely to academic
needs or needs displayed within the classroom, flagrantly contradict Congress' view
of the scope of education as embodied in the Act. Education certainly includes more
than academics. Likewise, educational performance encompasses more than perfor-
mance within a classroom environment. Such restricted views deny appropriate
educational services to those who need them the most. It is natural that the
manifestations of emotional disturbance will be reduced in a structured, monitored
classroom setting. However, more seriously impaired children will often fail to
generalize that controlled behavior and will regress once the structure is removed. To
deny these children a twenty-four hour structured educational environment where the
learning of appropriate behaviors can be constantly reinforced is to deny such
placements to those who most need them.217 Viewing education as consisting of only
academic instruction, and limiting educational performance to performance within
the classroom, denies Congress' intent to assist handicapped children in becoming
self-sufficient and in learning to function as total human beings within their particular
living environments.
In addition, the separate and balance approach often results in an impaired
child's needs being only partially addressed. Unlike most educational residential
facilities, many residential programs are geared toward addressing only a particular
type of need. When a child is referred to such a program because his adjudged
primary need is of that type, then that need is dealt with but often at the expense of
the child's other needs. For example, as in the Illinois case described above, 218
behaviorally disturbed children are often referred for placements in juvenile correc-
tional institutions because the constraint of their acting-out delinquent behavior is
deemed to be their primary need. 219 However, most correctional institutions are not
equipped to deal with the emotional or other mental health problems which cause the
child's behavior.220
Furthermore, the separate and balance approach directly contradicts the Act's
regulatory mandate that a residential placement be provided if it is necessary in order
217. See, e.g., Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 878 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (The court
favorably cites expert testimony, stating: "That Laura J.'s behavioral problems at school do not approach those at home
is not surprising. As Dr. Carrie indicated, although expert opinion is hardly necessary, a classroom is a structured setting
in which children are constrained into certain behaviors."); David D. v. Dartmouth, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 556:215 (D.
Mass. 1984) (ability to generalize behavioral controls learned in the classroom is a special educational goal requiring
residential placement) 775 F.2d 411 (lst Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1970 (1986).
218. 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:230 (SEA III. Jan. 12, 1984) (name not provided).
219. See, e.g., In re Ashley M., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:149, 506:150-51 (SEA Ga. Oct. 3, 1984) (ruling that
behaviorally disturbed child's acting-out is primary problem and should be dealt with through custody by Department of
Human Resources).
220. While a staff attorney for the Ohio Legal Rights Service, this author witnessed many such situations. In Ohio,
the primary need of many emotionally, behaviorally, or emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children was deemed to
be a constraint of their delinquent acting-out behaviors. As a result, they were referred to juvenile court where they were
adjudged delinquent and placed into residential facilities operated by the Department of Youth Services (DYS). These
facilities were designed merely for custodial care and confinement and were ill-equipped to address a child's emotional,
behavioral, or other handicapping conditions.
I represented one such child confined by DYS who was deaf and behaviorally disturbed. Upon investigation, I
discovered that the staff at the facility could not even communicate with the child as they were not versed in sign language.
DYS officials were also upset about this situation. Indeed, they were the ones who requested that I represent the child in
finding an "appropriate" residential placement that could address the child's varied needs.
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for a child to benefit from education. 221 A child who is determined to have a
noneducational primary need may nonetheless require an educational residential
placement to benefit from educational services. An emotionally disturbed child who
also suffers from an abusive home environment is one example. Although the child's
immediate and thus primary need is removal from the home, removal itself may not
dissipate the emotional disturbance. In this case, the child may very well require an
educational residential placement in order to benefit from educational services.
However, under the separate and balance approach the child would be referred to a
social service agency for placement "required by noneducational reasons.''222
C. North v. District of Columbia Board of Education and the Intertwined Needs
Approach
Another approach taken by administrative and judicial decisionmakers for
determining residential placement responsibility under the Act is the "intertwined
needs" approach. This approach also attempts, at least initially, to separate and
balance the needs of an impaired child. However, this method goes a step further in
that it is willing to admit, at least in some severe cases, that the various needs of a
handicapped child are "intertwined" and cannot be neatly separated. When inter-
twined needs are found, the decisionmaker will not assign responsibility for a
residential placement based upon needs which appear primary, but will, instead, take
into account the child's entire situation.
The source of this approach is North v. District of Columbia Board of
Education.2 3 In North, all parties agreed that a multiple handicapped child who was
diagnosed as epileptic with seizures, learning disabled, and seriously emotionally
disturbed, required a residential placement. However, school authorities argued that
the child's needs were primarily emotional, medical, and social rather than
educational. As a result, school officials felt that if the parents were unable or
unwilling to provide the placement, the appropriate action would be a neglect
proceeding in juvenile court to commit the child to a social service agency. In holding
that federal court was the proper forum under the Act, 224 the court rejected the school
district's argument stating:
221. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1987); See also supra note 190 and accompanying text (elaborating on the regulatory
requirement).
222. This is a clear example of how the comment to the Act's regulatory provision regarding residential placements
(distinguishing between placements made for educational and noneducational purposes) can be cited for support even
though the placement violates the regulatory mandate. See Stoppleworth, supra note 176, at 760 (offering further criticism
of this approach to residential placement responsibility). See also Wegner, Variations on a Theme-The Concept of Equal
Educational Opportunity and Programming Decisions Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
48 LAw & CoSmp.. lNoBs. 169, 173 (1985) (maintaining that when services address both educational needs and those
deemed noneducational, the services should nonetheless be required under the Act).
223. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
224. Id. at 141. However, the court was somewhat reluctant in accepting jurisdiction stating that notwithstanding
the clear directives of the Act,
[als a general proposition, it would seem preferable to have issues of the type involved in this case attended to
by social service agencies rather than by the school authorities, and litigated in state and local tribunals rather
than in the federal courts. It may well be that these philosophical considerations of federalism and of social
service expertise are overcome by the explicit statutory and regulatory provisions [of the Act] ....
Id. at 140.
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It may be possible in some situations to ascertain and determine whether the social,
emotional, medical, or educational problems are dominant and to assign responsibility for
placement and treatment to the agency operating in the area of that problem. In this case, all
of these needs are so intimately intertwined that realistically it is not possible for the Court
to perform the Solomon-like task of separating them.32
Consequently, instead of looking strictly to the child's handicapped-related needs, the
court took the child's entire situation into account in determining responsibility for
placement. Expert testimony established that the stigma resulting from an adjudica-
tion of neglect would further exacerbate the child's emotional problems and interfere
with the efforts to reunite the family. 226 The court held that due to the potential
dangers of a neglect proceeding, the only appropriate alternative was to order the
school district to provide a residential placement. 227 The district was ordered to
provide a placement which would meet all the child's needs including academic,
psychiatric, psychological, and medical. 2
28
However, the "intertwined needs" approach of North is also an inappropriate
method for determining residential placement responsibility under the Act. Like the
separate and balance method, the intertwined needs approach still involves an attempt
at categorizing and balancing. This approach does, however, sometimes admit the
inseparability of a child's needs at least in cases of the severely handicapped. This
progressive step, in effect, collapses the distinction between educational and other
needs. Unfortunately, instead of being guided by the Act in assigning placement
responsibility in such situations, the decisionmaker uses his own judgment. In North,
placement by the school district under the Act was deemed necessary by default as the
neglect proceeding was potentially harmful.2 29 As admirable as this result might be,
it opens the door for making placement decisions based on any number of
considerations, whether appropriate or not. Such considerations could include mere
administrative convenience, financial accessibility, or the number of beds available
in a particular program. Consequently, placement could be with an agency ill-
equipped to handle a child's total handicapping condition.
In addition, North's intertwined needs approach, like the separate and balance
approach, ignores the regulatory mandate that the school district provide a residential
placement under the Act when necessaiy for a child to benefit from education.2 30
Under the North approach, a child could very well be entitled to an educational
residential placement but be referred elsewhere due to inappropriate considerations.
Strictly following North could also result in a violation of the Act's statutory
language. The Act excludes medical services from those services required from the
school district as part of an appropriate education. 231 Despite this exclusion, the
225. Id. at 141.
226. Id. at 140.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 142.
229. Id. at 140-42.
230. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.302 (1987); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text (elaborating on the regulatory
requirement).
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) (excepting those medical services used for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes).
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North court, in deeming the child's medical needs as intertwined with his educational
needs, ordered the school district to provide medical services as part of the required
residential placement program. 232
D. Kruelle v. New Castle County School District; Beyond North: The Intertwined
Needs with the Educational Link Approach
Several residential placement cases have followed the North lead in abandoning
the attempt to separate and balance the needs of severely handicapped children. 233 In
Kruelle v. New Castle County School District,234 the Third Circuit was asked to
determine residential placement responsibility for Paul Kruelle, a profoundly retarded
child also suffering from cerebral palsy and serious emotional problems including
choking and vomiting when experiencing moderate stress. 235 All parties agreed that
the child required a residential placement. However, school authorities maintained
that the necessity for residential placement arose not from educational needs, but
from social and emotional problems requiring full-time services which were more in
the nature of "parenting" than education. 23
6
After unsuccessfully attempting to separate and balance the child's educational,
medical, social, and emotional problems, the court favorably cited the North opinion
in concluding that the child's needs were not severable. 237 However, the Kruelle
court went beyond North by next looking to the Act and asking whether the
residential placement was necessary for the child to benefit from education. 238 The
court determined that a residential placement was "critical to Paul's ability to learn,
for the absence of a structured environment contributes to Paul's choking and
vomiting which, in turn, interferes fundamentally with his ability to learn.'' 239
232. 471 F. Supp. 136, 142 (D.D.C. 1979).
233. E.g., Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982); San
Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1982); Manchester Bd. of Educ. v.
State Bd. of Educ., 1980-81 EHLR 552:397 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 1981); Wallingford v. State Bd. of Educ., 1980-81
EHLR 552:305 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1981).
234. 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
235. The court described the thirteen year old child as having
the social skills of a six month old child and [an] I.Q. [of] well below thirty. As found by the district court, "he
cannot walk, dress himself, or eat unaided. He is not toilet trained. He does not speak and his receptive
communication level is extremely low. In addition to his physical problems, he has a history of emotional
problems which result in choking and self-induced vomiting when experiencing stress."
Id. at 688-89 (quoting Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Del. 1980)).
236. 642 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1981).
237. Id. at 693-94.
238. Id. at 694 (stating, "[t]he statutory language requires courts to assess the link between the supportive service
or educational placement and the child's learning needs.").
239. Id. The Kruelle decision was actually presaged by the cryptic opinion in Erdman v. Connecticut, 1980-81
EHLR 552:218 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 1980). In Erdman, the court held that it was impossible to separate a seriously
emotionally disturbed child's emotional needs from his academic needs when developing his educational program.
Erdman v. Connecticut, 1980-81 EHLR 552:218, 552:219 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 1982). However, once needs were
determined not severable, the court deviated from the North approach by seeking guidance from the Act's regulation on
residential placement responsibility rather than from other factors in the child's situation. Because the child could not learn
without a twenty-four hour structured environment, the court ordered the Board of Education to provide the placement.
Erdman v. Connecticut, 1980-81 EHLR 552:218, 552:219 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 1980).
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Only one month later, the Kruelle approach was adopted by another federal court
in Papacoda v. Connecticut.240 At issue was the placement of an eighteen year old
emotionally and behaviorally disturbed child. School officials pointed to family
turmoil as a factor contributing to the child's problems in arguing that her needs were
primarily emotional, not educational. 241 The court abandoned any attempt to separate
the child's various needs. Instead, the court cited Kruelle in finding that the child's
intertwined needs made it necessary to provide educational services in a therapeutic
residential environment where they would be effective. 242
Decisionmakers in other cases have followed the Kruelle approach in determin-
ing residential placement responsibility. In Clevenger v. Oak Ridge School Board,2
43
the Sixth Circuit ordered a residential placement under the Act for an emotionally
disturbed nineteen year old. The school board argued that the child's primary needs
stemmed from hostile behavior and runaway tendencies that were separate from
educational problems. The court, however, found that the behavioral needs were
linked to educational needs in that the oppositional behavior constituted the child's
main learning problem. 244 As a result, the court held that a secured, locked residential
facility was necessary for the child to benefit from education as it would prevent his
impulsive running away. 245 Likewise, a Texas hearing officer utilized the Kruelle
approach in ordering an educational residential placement for a mentally retarded,
behaviorally disturbed child.246 The child's violent aggressive behavior led to
intermittent psychiatric hospitalization, too much sleep, and a lack of motivation.
These problems resulted in excessive school absences. The hearing officer ordered a
therapeutic residential program addressing the behaviors "to the extent necessary to
compel her school attendance and consequently, address her educational needs." 247
The analysis used in Kruelle is much closer to the meaning of the Act than that
used in North. Both approaches admit, at least in some complex cases, that a child's
needs, in reality, cannot be severed. However, the Kruelle approach looks to the Act
in formulating the next question: whether the residential placement is needed in order
for the child to benefit from education. If so, the residential program, with all of its
attendant services, is required by the Act. Although these services may, in some
240. 528 F. Supp. 68 (D. Conn. 1981).
241. It should be noted that although the child's emotional disturbance was related to family turmoil, merely
removing the child from the home would not have alleviated her condition. Id. at 71-72. Had that been the case, she
would not have qualified as a "handicapped child" under the Act. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
242. Id. at 71-72. The court stated: "This case is not simply one in which the plaintiff must be placed in a facility
to be treated solely for reasons of health. She must be placed in such a facility because such treatment is necessary in order
to render her educable." Id.
243. 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984).
244. Id. at 516.
245. Id.
246. Sandra S. v. Conroe Indep. School Dist., 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:281 (SEA Tex. Sept. 5, 1983).
247. Id. at 284. Accord Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107, 1120 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (court held residential placement a required related service under the Act to address the intertwined needs of two
emotionally disturbed children so they could receive benefit from educational programming); Gladys J. v. Pearland School
Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 875 n.8, 876-78 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (an extensive residential placement program with a behavior
modification component was ordered for a multiple-handicapped child with severe language and behavioral impairments
symptomatic of childhood schizophrenia. The court deemed placement necessary to address the child's intertwined needs
so that she could make some educational progress.).
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cases, be geared to addressing a child's emotions or behaviors, they are nonetheless
required if addressing such needs is necessary for a child to learn.
Although a large step forward, the Kruelle approach still does not fully comport
with the congressional intent of the Act. One reason is that this approach still
encourages, at least as an initial step, the misguided attempt at separating and
balancing a child's needs to determine whether placement is primarily for "educa-
tional" or "other than educational" purposes.
In addition, even when the attempt at separating and balancing a child's needs
is abandoned and the Act's question-whether a residential placement is needed for a
child to benefit from education-is addressed, the Kruelle approach still allows an
overly restrictive view of what constitutes education. 248 For example, in Erdman v.
Connecticut249 the court, while holding that it was impossible to separate a child's
emotional needs from his educational needs, nevertheless viewed education merely as
progress in academics.2 0 Likewise, in Manchester Board of Education v. State
Board of Education,251 the Connecticut Superior Court ordered a residential
placement under the Act to address intertwined needs because progress in academics
was being inhibited.25 2 It is entirely possible that a decisionmaker adopting such a
restricted view of learning could, even under the Kruelle approach, deny residential
placement under the Act as long as the child is making some academic progress
despite a lack of development in any other area. As demonstrated earlier, such a
narrow view of learning is at odds with the broad scope of education embraced by the
Act.
On the other hand, a strict adherence to the Kruelle approach may demand more
from school authorities than the Act contemplates. Although the Act exempts school
districts from providing medical services, 253 some courts have required educational
residential programs to address medical needs if they impact upon educational
progress. For example, in Clevenger the Sixth Circuit required the school district to
provide psychiatric treatment as part of the ordered educational residential pro-
gram.254 Another court went so far as to hold that placement in a psychiatric hospital
with all its attendant services was an "educational placement" to be paid for by the
school district because the child's medical needs could not be segregated from his
educational needs.2 5
248. However, it should be noted that the Kruelle court at least viewed the development of basic self-help skills as
education. 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating, "[wihere basic self-help and social skills such as toilet training,
dressing, feeding and communication are lacking, formal education begins at that point." (quoting Battle v. Pennsylvania,
629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1980)). Accord Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 228 (st Cir. 1983); see also
Wegner, supra note 222, at 202-04 (agreeing that the need to master basic self-care skills is an educational need).
249. 1980-81 EHLR 552:218 (D. Conn. Aug. 22, 1980).
250. Id. at 552:219.
251. 1980-81 EHLR 552:397 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 1981).
252. Id. at 552:398.
253. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985) (excepting those medical services used for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes).
254. 744 F.2d 514, 516.
255. Lunceford v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 555:201, 555:202 (D.D.C. 1983),
rev'd, 745 F.2d 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Such holdings do not comport with the Act's express language that, except for
diagnostic and evaluative purposes, medical services are not considered "related
services" which must be provided as part of an educational program. 25 6 Since the
exception is otherwise unqualified, it should not matter whether the medical needs
impact on the learning process. The Supreme Court supported this view when stating
that the Secretary of Education "could reasonably have concluded that [the medical
services exception] was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a
service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their
competence.' 257
VII. BEYOND KRUELLE: FILLING THE CRACKS IN EDUCATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In addition to being out of harmony with congressional intent behind the Act, the
above approaches to determining residential placement responsibility have failed to
stem the tide of litigation on this issue.258 Each approach fosters interagency
arguments over residential placement eligibility and responsibility. Educational
agencies persist in asserting a narrow view of educational needs and responsibilities
in order to avoid placement obligations. Parents, advocates, and other public agencies
argue a more comprehensive approach in an attempt to hold school authorities
responsible.
256. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
257. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892 (1984). Another danger of the Kruelle approach is the
proclivity to focus too heavily on the question of whether a child needs a residential placement to receive educational
benefit rather than undertaking the three-part analysis necessary to determine whether the child qualifies as "handi-
capped" under the Act.
In San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. State, 131 Cal. App. 3d 54, 182 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1982), the court was asked
to determine whether an emotionally disturbed child required an educational residential placement. Substantial evidence
was introduced into the record establishing that the child's emotional problems were greatly aggravated by an unstable,
emotionally charged home environment. 131 Cal. App. 3d at 59, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
The court took the first step in analyzing the child's status as "handicapped" by determining that he suffered from
impairments listed by the Act. 131 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 528. The court then took the second step in the
analysis by determining that the child's emotional impairment adversely affected his educational performance. 131 Cal.
App. 3d at 70-71, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
The court then compared its case to the facts in Kruelle and determined that the child needed a residential placement
in order to learn. The court reasoned that in order for the child to make educational progress, he needed to escape his
unstable home environment which was a major factor behind his learning problems. 131 Cal. App. 3d at 70-71, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 535. The court, while focusing on whether the child needed a residential placement in order to learn, failed to
ask the third question in the determination of whether the child qualified as handicapped under the Act, i.e., whether the
residential placement was necessary because of the impairments. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
34 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1987). In this case, although the child required some special educational services, he did not need
a residential placement because of his emotional impairments. Instead, the child required a residential placement in order
to escape an adverse home environment. Once out of this environment, his emotional problems might have subsided to
the point where he could have made sufficient educational progress from the special educational services that he was
already receiving in school. If this was the case, it is a situation when the appropriate social service agency should have
provided the residential placement.
258. See, e.g., Gels v. Board of Educ., 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985); Antkowiak v. Ambach, 621 F. Supp.
975 (W.D.N.Y. 1985); Tolland Bd. of Educ. v. Connecticut State Bd. of Educ., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 556:412 (D. Conn.
May 9, 1985); Christopher N. v. McDaniel, 569 F. Supp. 291 (D. Ga. 1983); Case No. SE-68-83, 1984-85 EHLR DEC.
506:195 (SEA Ill. Mar. 6, 1984); Case No. 84-0992, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:344 (SEA Mass. Dec. 5, 1984); Case
No. 84-0481, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:155 (SEA Mass. July 10, 1984); Case No. 83-0663, 1984-85 EHLR DEC.
506:160 (SEA Mass. May 1, 1984); Case No. 83-1165, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:298 (SEA N.J. Mar. 15, 1984); Case
No. 251, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:346 (SEA Pa. Mar. 14, 1985); Case No. 074-SE-383, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:230
(SEA Tex. Sept. 23, 1983).
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Interagency disputes over service provision responsibility are nothing new. Such
disputes certainly predate the Act. For example, in 1972 the District of Columbia
district court in Mills v. Board of Education59 noted that lack of appropriate
educational services to the plaintiff children was the result of lack of communication
and cooperation between state agencies. 260 Courts continue to criticize such inter-
agency buck-passing in cases brought under the Act. As one court stated: "It is
unfortunate that the assistance of this Court had to be invoked under federal statutes
to resolve what essentially are internal bureaucratic disputes." ' 261 Unfortunately,
these approaches, implemented to resolve these disputes, have had the effect of
promoting further controversies. Both the delays in the provision of services and
placements with agencies ill-equipped to handle the needs presented have had tragic
effects on handicapped children. Such buck-passing controversies have even caused
some children to fall between the cracks of purported agency responsibility and thus
receive no services at all. 262
These types of disputes and their deleterious effects are precisely what Congress
hoped to eliminate by enacting the EAHCA.263 Under an interpretation of the Act
consistent with congressional intent, such disputes would be eliminated. What is
required is an approach going one step further than that used by the Kruelle court. No
259. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
260. Id. at 876. See also In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974) (dispute over payment of services between the
Public Welfare Board and the Department of Education).
261. North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141 (D.D.C. 1979). The court went on to state:
Since this assistance has been sought, the Court must adjudicate plaintiff's rights and thereby resolve that which
the several District of Columbia agencies have been unable or unwilling to decide among themselves; that is,
who among them shall pay for plaintiff's residential treatment-treatment which all affected departments appear
to agree is both necessary and a responsibility of the District of Columbia Government.
Id. See also, e.g., Kruelle v. Biggs, 642 F.2d 687, 698 (3d Cir. 1981) ("what this case essentially involves is which
agency should pay for Paul's institutionalization. Evidently, the parent's attempt to seek aid under the Education Act has
triggered a 'buck-passing' sequence. ... ); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 225 & n.4 (Ist Cir. 1983)
(noting that state agencies were unable to agree as to which one was responsible for providing child with residential
placement).
262. While a staff attorney for the Ohio Legal Rights Service, I encountered a number of situations wherein needy
children were denied appropriate public services due to interagency buck-passing. In one case, the distressed parent was
forced to place her hearing-impaired, emotionally disturbed child into a private psychiatric hospital even though the child
was not mentally ill. The hospital informally agreed to retain the child, hoping that an appropriate public residential
placement would be arranged at once.
The child continued to regress as the hospital did not have the appropriate services to address his needs. Indeed, the
child started acquiring behaviors characteristic of the other mentally ill patients with whom he was confined. Hospital
doctor's evaluations and affidavits verified the child's regression and the inappropriateness of the placement. See
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Mitchell v. Walter, Case No. C-2-81-1202 (S.D. Ohio 1981), dismissed,
538 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
In another case, the desperate father of a multihandicapped, emotionally disturbed child walked to the local
courthouse and literally begged the juvenile court judge to assist in forcing public agencies to provide a placement for his
child. The judge immediately called our office for representation on behalf of the father and his child.
Each situation necessitated the filing of a lawsuit against the various state agencies to force their cooperation in
developing and providing appropriate residential placements. See McFarland v. Harris, Case No. 7703 (Ct. of Common
Pleas, Juv. Div. Coshocton County, Ohio 1982); Mitchell v. Walter, Case No. C-2-81-1202 (S.D. Ohio 1981), dismissed,
538 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Indeed, the Mitchell suit resulted in a settlement agreement whereby the Department
of Mental Health and the Department of Education combined their efforts and resources in developing and funding a
unique residential program for hearing-impaired, emotionally disturbed adolescents. See Consent Order, In re Impartial
Due Process Hearing as to Anthony Mitchell (SEA Ohio Sept. 1982).
263. See, e.g., SNATe RreRsT, supra note 5, at 1432; 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (comment) (1987) (referring to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(6) (1982) and stating in part, "[this section] reflects the desire of the Congress for a central point of responsibility
and accountability in the education of handicapped children within each State.").
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attempt should be made to separate a child's social, emotional, behavioral, and
educational needs to determine which is primary. Likewise, it is inappropriate to
focus on whether a child's various intertwined needs impact upon academic or
classroom performance. Instead, decisionmakers should acknowledge that social,
emotional, behavioral, and other such difficulties, in and of themselves, warrant
remedial intervention as educational needs rather than as opposed to or impacting
upon educational needs.
This expanded approach to determining service provision responsibility is
consistent with, indeed, is required by, Congress' adoption of the zero reject model
of special education. As set forth earlier, every handicapped child, regardless of the
severity of the handicapping condition, is considered educable under the Act.2 6 4
Congress intended that even the most severely handicapped child should have the
opportunity to increase self-sufficiency and independence.265 Educational interven-
tion for these children must, of necessity, include more than academic training. To
attain any further self-sufficiency, these children need training in such areas as basic
self-help skills, social interaction skills, and emotional and behavioral control. Thus,
such services must be deemed educational.
A necessary concomitant of Congress' adoption of the zero reject education
model is its wide view of the concept of education. This perspective includes an
expanded approach to determining responsibility for residential placements and other
services. As demonstrated earlier, both the Act's express language and its legislative
history indicate that Congress agreed with pre-Act judicial and professional views
that education be defined in the broad sense. This definition includes training and
assistance designed to help children develop as total human beings and function as
best they can whatever their living environment. 266 It is obvious that this view of
education would include as educational those services geared toward assisting a child
to control emotions and behavior and to interact appropriately with others.
It is reemphasized that responsibility under the Act is not limitless. The Act itself
establishes its own boundaries. As already explained, a child must meet the Act's
definition of handicapped in order to qualify for services.2 67 In addition, a child is
entitled to only those services listed in his Individualized Education Program. 268
Furthermore, medical services are excluded by the Act. 269
There have been a few scattered court decisions which, without expressly so
stating, have utilized this expanded approach to determine educational service
responsibility. In Capello v. District of Columbia Board of Education,270 the court
was asked to decide whether a mentally retarded and autistic child was entitled to
residential placement under the Act. The child's impairments were characterized by
264. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191-92 (1982).
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
267. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
268. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
269. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. II 1985) (excepting medical services for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes).
270. 1979-80 EHLR 551:500 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1980).
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a lack of interaction with others, a short attention span, and aggressive behavior
which posed a danger to both students and teachers. 271 Although the child had
developed rudimentary academic and self-care skills in a day school placement, the
court deemed an educational residential placement necessary so the child could also
develop self-control, self-awareness, and self-sufficiency. 272 The court relied on
expert testimony that established that a "consistent residential education in a calm,
rural setting is essential to the child's progress and is the only way to modify his
potential as an aggressive, dangerous adult.''273
In Bailey v. Unified School District No. 345,274 the school district argued that a
blind, hearing impaired, and emotionally disturbed child required residential place-
ment despite making advances academically in a day placement. 275 The court held
that an educational residential placement was necessary in order to assist the child in
maturing and learning to live with his handicaps. 276 Such intervention was necessary,
the court said, to alleviate the child's emotional problems, and the court further stated
that this intervention was clearly appropriate under the Act.277 Likewise, in David D.
v. Dartmouth School Committee,278 a Down's Syndrome child was held to require an
educational residential placement in order to learn internal controls for aggressive and
sexually inappropriate behaviors despite the fact that the child demonstrated the
ability to exercise such controls within the school setting. 279 The court concluded that
the ability to generalize social and behavioral skills acquired in the classroom is an
appropriate part of a special educational program so that the child may eventually be
able to function in a sheltered workshop setting. 280
These cases indicate a willingness by a few courts to order residential
placements to address social, emotional, and behavioral needs as educational needs
in and of themselves. In addition, a survey of administrative decisions under the Act
indicates that some hearing officers have taken the same approach. For example, an
Illinois hearing officer ordered an educational residential placement for a behaviorally
disordered child of seventeen whose impairment was characterized by such unpre-
dictable and dangerous acts as threatening a sibling with a knife, violent assaults,
theft, and possession of alcohol. 28' The hearing officer held the behavioral needs as
educational, thereby requiring "intensive, highly structured, continually monitored
and supervised interventive therapeutic related services in a residential placement to
271. Id. at 551:501.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 233 Kan. 714, 664 P.2d 1379 (1983).
275. Id. at 718-20, 664 P.2d at 1383-84.
276. Id. at 720, 664 P.2d at 1384.
277. Id.
278. 615 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 411 (4th Cir. 1985).
279. Id. at 647-48.
280. Id. at 647. The court stated:
It concurs with plaintiffs' experts' opinion that the goal of any special education program is to assist the student
to maximize the ability to be independent as an adult. In light of this unanimity, defendants' contention that
plaintiff's social behavior problems are unrelated to his educational needs must be dismissed.
Id. at 647 n.5.
281. Case No. SE-23-83, 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 505:185 (SEA Ill. Sept. 26, 1983) (name not provided).
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assure that his needs are served and the rights of other students protected. ' '282
Likewise, a California hearing officer ordered an educational residential placement
for a deaf child despite the fact that the child was making sufficient academic progress
in her day placement.2 83 The officer, in stating that education is more than academics,
ordered the placement to meet the child's frustration, problems with impulse control,
anxiety, low self-esteem, and other emotional problems.2 84
The decisionmakers in the above judicial and administrative cases did not
inquire into whether a child's emotional, behavioral, and social needs could be
separated from educational needs. Nor did they ask whether a child's intertwined
needs impact upon educational progress. Instead, such cases exemplify an implicit
recognition that the EAHCA's zero reject educational policy, and its broad view of
the concept of educational, emotional, behavioral, social, and other such needs,
require intervention as educational needs in their own right.
This expanded approach to determining service provision responsibility under
the Act is not only more consistent with congressional intent, it also serves to
eliminate some of the most difficult problems currently confronting administrative
and judicial decisionmakers, school authorities, and parents of handicapped children.
Hearing officers and judges would no longer be required to attempt the impossible
task of separating and balancing a child's various needs. Inappropriate placements
with agencies equipped to address only those needs of a child deemed primary-as
opposed to a child's total realm of needs-would be eliminated. In addition,
opportunities for administrative buck-passing through differing interpretations of the
scope of educational problems and responsibilities would be reduced by acknowl-
edgment of the broad definition of education. And the corresponding danger of needy
children falling through the cracks of purported interagency responsibility and
thereby receiving no services at all would be diminished. Furthermore, the increase
in expensive and time consuming litigation, fostered by the current approaches to
determining service responsibility, would be curbed.
Educational authorities will argue that the adoption of the expanded approach to
determining educational service responsibility will saddle already financially strapped
school districts with greatly increased fiscal burdens. However, although Congress
intended school authorities to be ultimately accountable for lack of appropriate
services to handicapped children, they did not intend that school districts be totally
responsible for the financial costs of all such services.
282. Id. at 505:187. This case clearly demonstrates the vast difference between this expanded approach and the
"separate and balance" approach to determining residential placement responsibility. Under the latter approach,
containment of the behaviors would have been deemed as the child's primary need. Thus, he would have probably been
referred to juvenile authorities and confined in a placement unable to address his underlying impairments. See supra note
220 and accompanying text.
283. In re Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:108 (SEA Cal. Aug. 24, 1984).
284. Id. at 506:110. See also In re William Q., 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:344 (SEA Mass. Dec. 5, 1984) (autistic
child with serious emotional and behavioral problems awarded residential placement under the Act in order to learn control
so that potential for self-sufficiency in a sheltered workshop could be attained). One hearing officer used this expanded
approach in ordering a nonacademic summer program for a Down's Syndrome child. The program was held necessary to
address social, emotional, and behavioral needs that were deemed educational in nature. In re Jay R., 1983-84 EHLR
DEC. 505:123, 505:125 (SEA Mass. July 8, 1983).
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Vi. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Before the passage of the EAHCA, the responsibility for providing the broad
range of services it mandates was divided among various state agencies. 285 As each
agency has its own area of expertise, the particular type of service a child required
usually dictated which agency was responsible.2 86 However, this decentralized
system of service provision was hallmarked by interagency disputes and, in many
cases, a complete lack of appropriate services for needy children.2 87
One of Congress' main objectives in enacting the EAHCA was to eliminate
interagency disagreements over service provision responsibility.2 88 To accomplish
this, Congress deemed it necessary to designate one agency as the overseer of service
provisions. As the Senate Report states: "The Committee considers the establishment
of single agency responsibility for assuring the right to education of all handicapped
children of paramount importance. Without this requirement, there is an abdication
of responsibility for the education of handicapped children.' '289 Considering its broad
view of education, it was natural that Congress designated the state educational
agency as the central supervisor.
However, merely because Congress believed single agency accountability would
better assure the provision of appropriate services, does not necessarily mean that
they intended one agency to assume full financial responsibility for all such
services. 290 Congress knew that the federal funds provided the state educational
agency through the Act would not be enough to cover all necessary services.29' The
Senate Report explicitly suggests that federal funds received by other state agencies
along with local and state funds be used to develop educational services.292 The state
educational agency was appointed merely to ensure that all such services and
programs, regardless of the particular agency provider, meet the standards embodied
in the EAHCA.293 As the Senate Report goes on to state:
The Committee bill requires that the State educational agency be responsible for
insuring that all requirements of the Act are carried out, and that all educational programs
for handicapped children within the State, including all such programs administered by any
other State or local agency, must meet State educational agency standards and be under the
general supervision of persons responsible for education of handicapped children.294
285. See SENATE RuoRT, supra note 5, at 1448 (stating: "Presently, in many States, responsibility is divided,
depending upon the age of the handicapped child, sources of funding, and type of services delivered.").
286. See id.
287. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
288. See SENATE RuoRT, supra note 5, at 1432.
289. See id. at 1448.
290. See Note, Defining the Scope of Residential Placement and Related Services Under the EHA: Difficult
Questions Left Unanswered in Illinois-In re Claudia K., 32 DEPAuL L. REv. 483, 512-13 (1983) (citing Makuch,
Year-Round Special Educational and Related Services: A State Director's Perspective, 47 ExncaoNAL CHan.EN 272 at 273
(1981) in maintaining that the Act does not require school districts to provide nor finance all necessary services).
291. See SENATE R mRT, supra note 5, at 1446 (stating: "The Committee rejects the argument that the Federal
Government should only mandate services to handicapped children if, in fact, funds are appropriated in sufficient amounts
to cover the full cost of this education.").
292. See id. at 1446-47.
293. See id. at 1448.
294. See id. (emphasis added). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6) (1982) (incorporating this language into the statute).
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Congress designated one agency ultimately responsible under the Act to assure
adequate supervision and easier accountability. However, Congress did not equate
accountability with full financial responsibility. Evidently, Congress assumed that
other state agencies would continue to develop, fund, and provide the educational
services most related to their particular area of expertise. The Senate Report indicates
this assumption in stating that, "while the Committee has provided that the State
educational agency is to be the final responsible authority for assuring that all
handicapped children have available to them free appropriate public education, it
does not intend that state and local educational agencies must be the sole providers
of such services." 295 Congress' belief that other state agencies would assist in the
provision of special educational services, especially very expensive services such as
residential placements, is further emphasized by the Act's regulatory language,
stating:
Each State may use whatever State, local, Federal, and private sources of support are
available in the State to meet the requirements of this part. For example, when it is necessary
to place a handicapped child in a residential facility, a State could use joint agreements
between the agencies involved for sharing the cost of that placement.296
Unfortunately, Congress' assumption of continued interagency assistance under
the Act was, for the most part, ill-founded. Instead, the Act inadvertently gives
agencies further incentive for withholding funds from educational services by its
ambiguous language regarding the state educational agency's responsibility.
Interagency disputes have been dealt with in a few states by legislation
mandating cooperation in the funding and delivery of special educational services. 297
It is not surprising that the complex litigation often arising from such disputes has
been virtually eliminated in these jurisdictions.2 98 Similar legislation should be
adopted in each state. 299 Under such a statutory scheme, the state educational agency
could still fulfill its responsibilities under the Act. The educational agency would
retain its role as the central supervising agency, overseeing the provision of
appropriate services to each eligible child. Parental dissatisfaction would still be
directed at educational agency authorities through the Act's due process proce-
295. See SENATs REPORT, supra note 5, at 1446.
296. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a) (1987).
297. See Mooney & Aronson, supra note 176, at 546 & n.72 (citing such statutes). In February of 1984, after
numerous lawsuits, (see, e.g., supra note 262) state agencies in Ohio attempted to mandate interagency cooperation
through a voluntary contractual agreement between the Departments of Education, Public Welfare, Mental Health, Mentai
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, and Youth Services and Health. The contract created the "Interdepartmental
Cluster for Services to Youth" (Cluster) made up of representatives from each of the signing agencies. The Cluster was
developed to assign and coordinate interagency responsibility for the provision of services to children refenred by
local/county agencies after existing program options had been exhausted or deemed inappropriate in view of the distinctive
nature of the child's situation. See Exhibit 8 to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Mitchell v. Berry,
Case No. 85-07251 (Ct. Ci. July 1985). Ironically, because the interagency cooperation was not legislatively mandated,
the agreement was allowed to expire due to interagency disputes over the terms for its renewal.
298. See Mooney & Aronson, supra note 176, at 546 & n.73.
299. See Makuch, Year-Round Special Educational and Related Services: A State Director's Perspective, 47
ExcE noNAL CnaENs 274 (1981) (arguing for separate legislation mandating interagency service provisions and funding
of various services, including many of those currently listed as "related" under the EAHCA, so that even those not
meeting the Act's eligibility requirements will be appropriately served). See also Note, supra note 290 at 515 (asserting
the need for a legal mandate requiring human service agencies to perform their respective roles).
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dures. 300 If additional or substitute services are ruled necessary, they would be funded
and provided according to the legislatively mandated cooperative scheme. In this
way, congressional intent for "one agency" supervision and accountability would
still be met while the often heavy financial burden would be shared.
In addition to eliminating long delays in the provision of appropriate services
and the litigation these delays often spur, there would be an additional benefit to
mandated interagency cooperation. Agencies that are required to work together in
the funding and provision of services, would have a convenient forum for sharing
their knowledge and experience in developing particular types of programs. This
sharing of expertise can only serve to escalate the quality of services provided. 30 '
Out of a lack of awareness or any number of political reasons, state legislatures
have not been quick to follow the few states which have required interagency
cooperation. The situation may very well demand an amendment to the EAHCA
conditioning the receipt of federal funds on the establishment of state interagency
cooperative agreements. Such an amendment would certainly be consistent with
Congress' intent of assuring the timely provision of appropriate special educational
services to the nation's handicapped children. Indeed, it would merely codify what
Congress mistakenly assumed would happen voluntarily under the Act.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act was enacted to assure that
every handicapped child receives an appropriate education. Tremendous advances
have been made toward this goal since the Act's inception. However, Congress'
ambiguous specification of which needs must be addressed as "educational" under
the Act has led to complex litigation regarding what services school districts must
provide. Ironically, the Act is often used as a justification for denying appropriate
services to those who require them the most-the severely handicapped.
The educational-noneducational debate most often arises when expensive
nontraditional services like the residential placement are at issue. This Article has
reviewed the methods decisionmakers have developed to resolve these disputes and
has demonstrated that these approaches foster continued controversy. It is suggested
that an expanded approach be adopted by recognizing that handicapped children
present a variety of unique needs which transcend the conventional educational-
noneducational distinction. The needs of handicapped children, especially those with
severe impairments, require a wide array of services not traditionally associated with
the education of the nonhandicapped. This Article attempts to demonstrate that
Congress intended to collapse the educational-noneducational dichotomy by embrac-
ing a broad definition of education in the Act; a definition which, in many cases,
includes needs which arise as a result of problems in the social, emotional,
300. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1982).
301. See, e.g., supra note 262 (referring to the unique and creative residential program for hearing-impaired,
emotionally disturbed adolescents developed by the Ohio Departments of Education and Mental Health pursuant to a
consent order).
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behavioral, and custodial areas. Through this recognition, Congress hoped to
eliminate the interagency buck-passing prevalent in the provision of services to
handicapped children.
This Article concluded by suggesting that the educational needs of the
handicapped, because they often require innovative and expensive services, can, in
many instances, best be met through cooperative undertakings by state human service
agencies. These ventures, supervised by the state educational agency under the Act's
directives, would include a sharing of professional expertise and financial resources
in developing a high quality service provision network. Only then will Congress'
laudable goal be met: allowing an equal opportunity for this nation's handicapped
children to develop as total human beings in whatever their living environment
through the provision of appropriate educational services.
